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The South African Income Tax Act contains a number of specific anti-avoidance 
sections, as well as a general anti-avoidance section. This dissertation will focus 
on the general anti-avoidance section 103 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 
and highlight the individual requirements and their interpretation by the courts. 
Special consideration will be given to the difficulties of the normality 
requirement. The amendments made to the section and a brief consideration· of 
similar general anti-avoidance provisions in other countries shall also be 
evaluated. 
Where tax cases are analysed it must be kept in mind that the burden of tax is 
imposed by Parliament in the form of the Income Tax Act or other laws while it 
is the Courts that apply these laws. The 'task' of the Courts has accordingly 
been described by Lord Templeman in the recent case of Ensign Tankers 
(Leasing) Ltd v Stokes: 1 
'The task of the courts is to construe documents and analyse facts 
and to ensure the taxpayer does not pay too little tax or too,_much tax 
but the amount of tax which is consistent with the true effect in law of 
the taxpayer's activities. Neither the taxpayer nor the Crown should 
be deprived of the fiscal consequences of the taxpayer's activities 
properly analysed. ' 
Having this '_task' in mind we will see how the general anti-avoidance provision 
has been enforced by the Courts. We will see if section 103 is the powerful 
[1992) 2 All ER 275 at 286 (HL). 
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sword in the hands of the Commissioner of Revenue or just another 'paper 
tiger'. Lastly I will deal with the general provision against the utilization o( 
assessed losses s 103(2) and dividend and interest swaps sl03 (5). 
2 Evasion, avoidance and mitigation 
The contest between the Revenue authority and the taxpayer is as old as the · 
concept of tax itself. While it is in the interest of the Commissioner of Revenue . 
to raise as much tax as possible, it is in the taxpayer's interest to minimize his 
burden of tax. With regard to this conflict Lord Tomlin made the following 
statement in the famous English case of IRC v Duke of Westminster:2 
'Every man is entitled if he can to order his a.ff airs so as that the 
tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise 
would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this 
result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot 
be compelled to pay an increased tax'. 
The principle enunciated in the Duke of Westminster's case has been recognised 
by the South African courts. 3 Nevertheless the principle is of no guidance in the 
search for the means and methods which can be employed by the taxpayer and 
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' ... Lord Tomlin's oft quoted dictum in /RC v Duke of Westminster 
tells us little or nothing as to what methods of ordering one's affairs 
will be recognised by the couns as effective to lessen the tax that 
would attach to them if business transactions were conducted in a 
straight-forward way. ' 
The question to be posed remains: How far can the taxpayer go - can the 
taxpayer deliberately enter into all kinds of transactions to save tax? In other 
words: Is there a Rubicon that can't be crossed, and if so, when has the taxpayer 
crossed such a Rubicon ? 
a) Freedom of choice 
It was argued by David Clegg that a taxpayer has a "Freedom of choice":5 
'... the taxpayer is entitled to create a situation by entry into a 
transaction which would attract tax consequences for which the Act 
makes specific provision and that the validity of the transaction is not 
affected by... (section 103) merely because the tax consequences 
which it attracts are advantageous to the taxpayer and he enters into 
the transaction deliberately with the view to gaining that advantage. ' 
s David J M Clegg 1 SATJ 1986 224 at 229; it appears to me that David Clegg 
might have changed his position in this regard. The author accepted in an 
article the year following the distinction made between mitigation and 
avoiwu;ice in the New Zealand case of CIR v Challenge Corporation Ltd 
(1986); David Clegg (1987) 3 Tax Planning 67 at 68. 
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b) Criticism 
I respectfully disagree with this opinion. It is my opinion that the taxpayer is 
limited in the scope of his transactions. The reasons therefore are twofold. 
Primarily the taxpayer would be allowed or even forced to enter into all kinds of 
artificial schemes in order to minimize his tax. These transactions would make 
no commercial sense except to attract a minimum amount of tax. Secondly the 
choice-principle would lead to severe restrictions on the operation of the anti-
avoidance provision s 103. Past experience in Australia has shown that the 
acceptance of the choice-principle had crippled the former s 260 of the 
Australian Act (the Australian equivalent to our s 103). 6 
If it is accepted that the taxpayer is restricted in his choice of methods the 
question remains: Which methods can the taxpayer employ in order to arrange 
his affairs in the best possible way or in other words: When is the Rubicon 
crossed? 
It is my opinion that the Rubicon is found in the distinction between tax evasion 
and avoidance on the one side and tax mitigation on the other side. The Rubicon 
is crossed where the taxpayer leaves the solid ground of tax mitigation and 
crosses over to the banks of tax avoidance. 
I therefore understand the dictum of Lord Tomlin in the Duke of Westminster-
case as follows: Only in cases of tax mitigation is the taxpayer free to arrange 
6 Section 260 has been replaced in 1981 by Part IV A of the Australian 
Assessment Act. The choice principle is dealt with now in s 177 B(l) and s 
177(C)(2); For more information on the choice-principle in the Australian Law 
see: Y. Grbich, A.J. Bradbrook, K. Pose ; Revenue Law , Cases and Materials 
, 1990 at 922 ff .. 
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his affairs in a manner which attract a minimum of tax. This approach finds its 
authority in the dictum of Lord Templeman in Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v 
Stokes:7 
'In the present case the argument for the taxpayer company amounts 
to TUJ more than a repetition of the dictum of Lord Tomlin in the Duke 
of Westminster case . . . . Subsequent events have shown that though 
this dictum is accurate so far as tax mitigation is concerned it does 
TUJt apply to tax avoidance. ' 
It is submitted that the distinction between tax mitigation and tax avoidance was 
neither considered nor implied in the Duke of Westminster's case. 8 
c) Distinction between tax evasion and avoidance 
For the reasons given tax evasion and avoidance has to be distinguished from tax 
mitigation. Accordingly I will first differentiate between evasion and avoidance. 
I will then distinguish tax avoidance from tax mitigation. 
Tax avoidance has to be distinguished from tax evasion. While tax avoidance is 
the lawful attempt to reduce the burden of tax, tax evasion is the unlawful 
attempt to escape from tax. 
Tax evasion constitutes a criminal offence. 9 In the case of conviction the 
offender faces a fine not exceeding R 1000,- or imprisonment for a period not 
7 
8 
Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v Stokes [1992] 2 All ER 275 at 291 (HL). 
CIR v Challenge Corporation Ltd. [1986] STC 548 at 554. 
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exceeding 2 years, or both. It is noteworthy thats 104(2) includes an important 
presumption. If it can be proved that any false statement or entry is made in any 
return rendered on behalf of or by the taxpayer, the taxpayer will be presumed to 
have caused that return with the intent to evade tax. Over and above these 
sanctions the offender might be prosecuted for fraud. 
Besides the criminal charges there are severe tax consequences in the case of tax 
evasion for the delinquent. In terms of s 76(l)(c) a triple tax as an additional tax 
can be imposed on the offender. Strictly speaking this is not a triple tax but only 
twice the amount of the difference between the tax to be paid and the tax being 
paid. As the taxpayer also has to pay the tax for the current year one speaks of 
triple tax. While the Commissioner generally has the power to remit the 
additional tax as he thinks fit he cannot do so in cases of tax evasion. 10 It should 
be noted that the taxpayer can appeal against the additional assessment 
separately .11 The courts may then in its discretion reduce, confirm or increase 
the amount of the additional charge imposed. 12 Furthermore can the additional 
assessment be made for the past disregarding the three-year rule of s 79 (1). 
Additional assessments for the past are in general limited to the time period of 
three years. 
This time-limit has two reasons. First of all there must be a time from 





Section 104(1) does not declare tax evasion as such to be a criminal offence. 
The section only attaches to certain acts, listed as (i) - (iv), criminal sanctions 
as far as these acts were committed with the intent to evade or to assist in 
evasion. 
Section 76 (2)(a). 
See for example the recent case: ITC 1540. 
Section 83 (13) (b). 
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There must be a finality of an assessment. Secondly the taxpayer is troubled with 
the onus of proof by s 82. The longer the time of investigation in tax matters 
goes back the harder it gets for the taxpayer to track record. The three-year rule 
of s 79 does not apply in the case of fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure 
of material facts. 13 Material facts are those which are material in relation to the 
liability for tax. 14 Tax evasion falls under these exceptions of the three-year rule. 
Therefore a full investigation will be launched into the evasion without time-
limitations for the past.15 
It should be noticed that the word ' avoision' has been used as a term to describe 
the amalgam of tax avoidance and tax evasion. 16 This terminology is misleading 
as it disrespects the legal distinction between tax avoidance as legal and tax 
evasion as illegal. 17 
d) Distinction between tax mitigation and avoidance 
The distinction has been made between tax mitigation and tax avoidance by Lord 
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'Income tax is mitigated by a taxpayer who reduces his income or 
incurs expenditure in circumstances which reduce his assessable 
income or entitle him to reduction in his liability ... 
Income tax is avoided . . . when the taxpayer reduces his liability to 
tax without involving him in the loss or expenditure which entitles 
him to that reduction. ' 
The same Lord Templeman gave the judgement in the Ensign Tankers-case. 19 
The facts of the case were like this. A transaction was entered into whereby the 
Victory Partnership expended 3.25 m pounds towards the production of a film in 
which Victory Partnership had a 25 % interest. The scheme had the apparently 
"magic result" of creating for tax purposes an expenditure of 14 m pounds while 
incurring a real expenditure of only 3.25 m pounds. The taxpayer subsequently 
claimed a generated first-year allowance of 14 m pounds. Lord Templeman 
held: 20 
'This is tax avoidance and falls within the principles of Ramsay21 and 
subsequent decisions of the House. ' 




Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v Stokes [1992] 2 All ER 275 (HL). 
ibid at 290. 
W T Ramsay Ltd v IRC (1981] STC 174. The principle of Ramsay was 
summarized by Lord Fraser in Furniss (Inspector of Revenue) v Dawson [1984] 
1 All ER 530 at 532:' The true principle of the decision in Ramsay was that the 
fiscal consequences of a preordained series of transactions, intended to operate 
as such, are generally to be ascertained by considering the result of the series as 
a whole, and not by dissecting the scheme and considering each individual 
transaction separately.' 
- 9 -
'So far, at any rate, a tax avoidance scheme has been recognisable 
by "the apparently magic result" pointed out by Lord Fraser in 
Ramsay23••• There is nothing magical about tax mitigation whereby 
the taxpayer sujf ers a loss or incurs expenditure inf act as well as in 
appearance.' 
Following the above made distinctions it is submitted that only in the case of tax 
mitigation the taxpayer is enjoying the freedom of choice to enter into proper 
transactions to minimize his burden of tax. 
It has been suggested that terms as ' avoidance, evasion and avoision' should be 
replaced with the easily understood concept of compliance and non-compliance 
with the law. 24 I respectfully disagree as the word tax avoidance has a well 
known negative connotation for the majority of the taxpayers. If a new 
terminology should be introduced it should be the one of tax ' mitigation' as 




supra, {nl9), at 290-1. 
supra, (n21). 
(1989) 28 Income Tax Reporter 69 at 72. 
3. The general anti-avoidance provision of s.103 
The anti-avoidance provision s 103 can be split up into three substantive 
provisions. The first, the general provision of s 103 (1) is focused on 
transactions and arrangements that have the effect of avoiding, postponing or 
reducing income tax. The second provision s 103(2) deals with the utilization of 
assessed losses for the purpose of tax avoidance and finally the third provision s 
103(5) deals with dividend and interest swaps. Before I analyse the three 
provisions in detail some clarity about the interpretation of fiscal statutes has to 
be gained. 
a) Interpretation of f JSCal statutes 
The interpretation of a statute is necessary where the provision in question is 
ambiguous or obscure. Where the meaning of a provision is perfectly clear, there 
is no need for interpretation.25 But what is meant by 'ambiguity'? The meaning 
of ambiguity has been explained by Sir Percy Spender in the following way:26 
'Ambiguity may be hidden in the plainest and most simple of words 
even in their natural and ordinary meaning. Nor is it always evident 
by what legal yardstick words read in their natural and ordinary 
sense may be judged to produce an unreasonable result. ' 
How are fiscal statutes then to be interpreted in the case of ambiguity? Lord 
Cairns made the following statement in Partington v The Attorney-General about 




CIR v Britz 1952 (4) SA 624 at 629 (AD). 
Sir Percy Spender in ICJ Reports 1962 at 184. 
LR 4 HL 100 at 122. 
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' ... , because as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it 
is this: If a person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the 
law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the 
judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to 
recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, 
the subject is free, however apparently within the law the case might 
otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be an equitable 
construction, cenainly such a contruction is not admissible in a 
taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the words of the 
statute.' 
This construction of fiscal statutes has been adopted by the South African 
Courts.28 Furthermore it was expressed per Rowlatt Jin Cape Brandy Syndicate 
V IRC:29 
'It simply means that in a taxing Act one has to look at what is 
clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity 
about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be 
read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the 
language used. ' 
Both quotations emphasize the literal interpretation of tax statutes. 30 The 




CIR v George Forest Timber Company Ltd 1924 AD 516 at 531-2; CIR v Wolf 
1928 AD 177 at 184-5; CIR v Estate Kohler 1953(2) SA 584 at 592 (AD). 
(1921) 1 KB 64 at 71; CIR v Simpson 1949 (4) SA 678 at 695 (AD). 
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b) Intention of the Legislature 
Tax statutes are not subject to special treatment which is not applicable in the 
interpretation of other legislation. 
'There is no particular mystique about "tax law". Ordinary legal 
concepts and terms are involved and the ordinary principles of 
interpretation of statutes fall to be applied. One must look fairly at 
the language used to determine the intention of the Legislature'. 31 
In CIR v Delfos Wessels CJ dealt with the interpretation of s 1 of the Act. After 
having approved the dicta in Partington v Attorney-General and its acceptance in 
CIR v George Forest Timber Company he then continued:32 
'I do not understand this to mean that in no case in a taxing Act are 
we to give to a section a narrower or wider meaning, for in all cases 
of interpretation we must take the whole statute into consideration 
and so arrive at the true intention of the Legislature.' 





Meyerowitz and Spiro, supra, (n14), para 24 ff, 26. 
SIR v Kirsch 1978 (3) SA 93 at 94. 
1933 (AD) 242 at 253-254. 
Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 715 at 727 (AD). 
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'However that may be, it is clear from the remarks of Wessels C.J. in 
the Delfos-case, supra, that even in the interpretation of fiscal 
legislation the true intention of the Legislature is of paramount 
importance, and, I should say, decisive.' 
It follows therefore that the intention of the Legislature is of great importance for 
the interpretation of statutes in general and for the interpretation of fiscal statutes 
in particular. 
c) Contra fISCum rule 
But what happens if the intention of the Legislature is not expressed in crystal 
clear terms? Statutes that impose a burden on a subject must, in the case of 
ambiguity, be interpreted in favour of the subject. This is a rule which applies 
for all legislation. 34 Taxation statutes are just a classical example of a statute that 
imposes a burden on a subject. L C Steyn, in his book on interpretation of 
statutes comes to the following conclusion:35 
'Die beswaarde onderdaan moet altyd die voordeel van die twyfel 
geniet. As sy geval nie binne die duidelike bepaling van die wet staan 
nie, gaan hy vry uit. ' 
This general rule finds a special application in tax law in the form of the contra 




L C Steyn, Die Uitleg van Wette, at 110. 
ibid. 
Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) 715 at 727 (AD). 
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contra fiscum rule numerous times. 37 But where there is ambiguity then the 
contra fiscum rule applies to all fiscal provisions. 38 It must be kept in mind that 
the contra fiscum rule is invoked only where there is a manifest ambiguity which 
creates a doubt in the taxing statute. 39 
d) The interpretation of s 103 
The problem to be solved now is whether the contra-fiscum rule is applicable to 
the general anti-avoidance provision s103. Should the taxpayer be safeguarded 
by a narrow interpretation following the contra fiscum rule or should . the 
legislature's paramount intention dominate? Botha JA was oppossed to a 
restrictive interpretation of the general anti-avoidance section 103 (2) in Glen 
Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR, holding:40 
'In any event I do TlOt understand the [contrafiscumr1 rule to be that 
every provision of a fiscal statute, whether it relates to the tax 
imposed or TWt, should be construed with due regard to any rules 
relating to the interpretation of fiscal legislation. Section 103 of the 
Act is clearly directed at defeating tax avoidance schemes. It does TWt 
impose a tax, TWr does it relate to the tax imposed by the Act or to 






Estate Reynolds and Others v CIR 1937 AD 57 at 70 (AD); lsraelsohn v CIR 
1952 (3) SA 529 at 540 (AD); CIR v Mc Neil 1959 (1) SA 481 at 489 {AD). 
The contra fiscum rule applies in South Africa to all legislation concerned with 
taxation. It does not matters whether the legislation relates to income tax, 
estate duty or transfer duty. SBI v Raubenheimer 1969 (4) SA 314 {AD); see 
also Lewis R Dison, 'The Contra Fiscum Rule In Theory And Practice', 1976 
SAU 159 at 163. 
Badenhorst and Others v CIR 1955 (2) SA 207 at 215. 
Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 715 (AD). 
Own italics of author. 
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schemes designed for the avoidance of liability therefore. It should, 
in my view, therefore, not be construed as a taxing measure but 
rather in such a way that it will advance the remedy provided by the 
section and suppress the mischief against which the section is 
directed... The discretionary powers of the Commissioner should, 
therefore, not be restricted unnecessarily by interpretation. ' 
In Botha' s opinion section 103 has to be given a wide interpretation in order to 
give the words their full breadth. 
e) Criticism of the Glen-Anil approach 
The dictum of Botha has received some criticism from academic writers. 42 
Botha' s first point is that the fiscal statutes are interpreted in the same manner as 
other statutes. Davis' point of view is that w statutes should be interpreted 
differently than other statutes. The justification therefore is found in the 
existence of the contra ti.scum rule. The contra ti.scum rule is a recognised 
principle in the Roman-Dutch law [non male judicat qui in dubio contra 
fJSCum judicat]. 
There is no doubt that our law has accepted the contra ti.scum rule. 43 This has 




D M Davis, 'Tax Avoidance - the British example', in De Rebus 347 at 347; 
Lewis R Dison, • The Contra Fiscum Rule in Theory and Practice', SAU 
(1976) 1S9 at 179. 
Estate Reynolds and Others v CIR 1937 AD S7 at 70 (AD); lsraelsohn v CIR 
19S2 (3) SA S29 at S40 (AD); CIR v Mc Neil 19S9 (1) SA 481 at 489 (AD). 
Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR 197S (4) SA 71S at 727 (AD). 
,. 
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mind that s 103 is not imposing a new tax on the taxpayer and therefore is not a 
penalty section. 45 Any liability of the taxpayer to pay tax must be found 
somewhere else. The criticism advanced against this argument is of more weight. 
Davis said that it is ' questionable in the extreme' to argue that because a section 
does not impose a tax per se the conclusion must be reached that the provision 
does not come under the ambit of the contra fiscum rule, even if there is 
ambiguity in the legislature. 46 
O English approach 
I submit that such a 'per se' conclusion is wrong. It is true that not only tax-
imposing statutes can create a burden on the shoulders of the taxpayer; 
administrative statutes can also burden the taxpayer. Nevertheless, I consider the 
result reached in the Glen-Anil case to be correct for the following reasons. The 
interpretation of the anti-avoidance provision can not follow the contra fiscum 
rule. · 
Apparently Botha might have had this in mind when he said:47 
in any event I do not understand the rule to be that every 




See Schreiner in regard to s 90 in: CIR v King 1947 (2) SA 196 at 216 (AD). 
D M Davis, 'Tax Avoidance - the British example', in De Rebus 347 at 347. 
Glen Ani1 Development Corporation Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 715 at 727 (AD). 
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not, should be coristrued with due regard to any rules relating to 
fiscal legislation. ' 
Authority for this point is found in the House of Lords. Also English legislation 
does not know a general anti-avoidance provision and therefore doesn't have an 
equivalent to s 103. The English tax law nevertheless has specific anti-avoidance 
provisions. The interpretation of these provisions might throw some light on the 
treatment of the contra ti.scum rule in our s103. 
In IRC v Joiner48 the taxpayer had obtained a tax advantage in consequence of a 
'transaction in securities' within s 467(1) of the Income and Corporation Tax 
Act of 1970. The commissioner issued a notice to the taxpayer under s 460(3) 
specifying the adjustments which were requisite for counteracting the tax 
advantage. The taxpayer contended that s460 did not apply to him since the 
distribution, being a step taken in the course of the liquidation of the company, 
was not a ' transaction in securities', within ss 460( 1) and 467 (1) of the Act. 
It was expressed per Lord Wilberforce:49 
' ... , it appears from the opinion of Lord Reid in Greenberg v Inland . 
Revenue Comrs that the sectioris called for a different method of 
interpretation from that traditionally used in taxing Acts. For 
whereas it is generally the rule that clear words are required to 
impose a tax, so that the taxpayer has the benefit of doubts or 
48 
49 
[1975] STC 657 (HL). 
ibid at 662. 
- 18 -
ambiguities, Lord Reid made it clear that the scheme of the sections, 
introducing as {hey did a wide and general attack on tax avoidance, 
required that expressions which might otherwise have been cut down 
in the interest of precision were to be given the wide meaning 
- evidently intended, even though they led to a conclusion shon of 
' 
which judges would normally desire to stop. If we are to follow this 
path, and I see no other open to us, we must continue to give 
'transactions in securities' and 'transactions relating to securities' 
the widest meaning.' 
The ruling of the House of Lords has been applied in William v IRC. 50 It is my 
opinion that the South African courts should follow that path as well. 
Considering the English jurisdiction it follows that the contra fiscum rule is not 
applicable to s 103. Ergo, the interpretation of s 103 always has to be seen in the 
light of the Legislature's paramount intention to provide a remedy against the 
mischief it was introduced for, or to put it into Botha's words: 51 
'It should, in my view, therefore, not be construed as a taxing 
measure but rather in such a way that it will advance the remedy 
_ provided by the section and suppress the mischief against which the 
section is directed. ' 
The courts should therefore give the words their full breadth of meaning. 
50 
51 
(1979) STC 598 at 613. 
Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 715 at 727-728 
(AD). 
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g) Interpretation with two languages 
Finally it should be noted that the Act exists in two languages. Section 108 (2) of 
the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, No. 32 of 1961, provides for all 
Acts to be in both languages, but in the case of a conflict between the two copies 
of an Act that copy signed by the State President prevails. 52 
52 Section 65. 
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4 s. 103 (1) and its requirements 
(1) Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that any transaction, operation 
or scheme ( whether entered into or carried out before or after the 
commencement of this Act, and including a transaction, operation or 
scheme involving the alienation of property ) -
(a) has been entered into or carried out which has the effect of 
avoiding or postponing liability for the payment of any tax, 
duty or levy imposed by this Act or any previous Income Tax 
Act, or of reducing the amount thereof; and 
(b) having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, 
operation or scheme was entered into or carried out -
(i) was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner 
which would not normally be employed in the entering 
into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or 
scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or 
scheme in question; or 
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally 
be created between persons dealing at arm .. s length 
under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature 
of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; 
and 
(c) was entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purpose 
of the avoidance or the postponement of liabililty for the 
payment· of any tax, duty or levy ( whether imposed by this 
Act or any previous Income Tax Act or any other law 
administered by the Commissioner ) or the reduction of the 
amount of such liability, the CommiS41ioner shall determine the 
liability for any tax, duty or levy imposed by this Act, and the 
amount thereof, as if the transaction, operation or scheme had 
not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in 
the circumstances of the case he deems appropriate for the 
prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or 
reduction. 
The general avoidance provision-co.nsist§_.of-fQur elements. These elements have 
~-- ~ . 
been summarized in SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert as follows :53 
53 
(a) a transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out; 
(b) which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on 
income or reducing the amount thereof; and which 
1971 (3) SA 567 at 571-2 (AD); SIR v Gallagher 1978 (2) SA 463 at 470 
(AD); Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 at 491 (AD). 
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( c) in the opinion of the Secretary, 54 having regard to the circumstances 
under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into 
or carried out,-
(i) was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner 
which would not normally be employed in the entering 
into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme 
of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in 
question; or 
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be 
created between persons dealing at arm' s length under a 
transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the 
transaction operation or scheme in question; and that 
( d) the avoidance, postponement or reduction of the amount of such 
liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of 
the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme. 
All of the four elements must be present for s 103(1) to apply. 55 If the taxpayer 
can prove that only a single one of these elements is missing, the liability for tax 
can not be determined under s 103 ( 1). 
a) The First Element 
(i) transaction, operation or scheme 
The first element requires that a transaction, operation or scheme was entered 
into or carried out. A transaction or operation would be a contract, agreement, 
arrangement, plan etc .. 56 The first anti-avoidance provision s 90 spoke of 
' transaction or operation'. 57 Just five years after its enactment the word 
'scheme' was added.58 The word scheme includes transactions and operations. 






The Commissioner was at that time called Secretary. 
SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 at 571-2 (A); Ovenstone 
v SIR 1980 (2) SA 721 at 730 (AD). 
There are' almost no cases reported which are helpful in defining the meaning of 
transacti~n or operation: In L v COT 1975 (2) SA 649 (RAD) it was held that 
the retention of profits constituted a transaction and operation but not a scheme. 
Section 90 of Act 31 of 1941; see Apendix I. 
Section 90 was substituted bys 20 of Act No.55 of 1946. 
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opposite to a scheme as the cases of Meyerowitz and Louw have shown. This 
cases will be discussed below. 
In the case of Meye~v~59 the meaning of 'scheme' was analysed. The 
facts of the case were as follows. The taxpayer and two others had formed a 
company to produce a magazine (The Taxpayer). The company later sold its 
right for a nominal sum to a partnership. Instead of the taxpayer, a trust for the 
taxpayer's minor children was a partner in this partnership. The taxpayer 
continued to render editorial services for a small remuneration. It was held that 
the taxpayer avoided tax on the income of the trust. The income produced was 
the sole product of the taxpayer's labour. 
In this case the distinction between a ' series of transactions' and a ' scheme' was 
of relevance. The transactions in itself were sound as each of them on its own 
did not amount to tax avoidance. Only when one looked at the series of 
transactions as a scheme the whole picture resulted in tax avoidance. 
The councel for Meyerowitz submitted that a scheme may consist of a series of 
transactions, nevertheless the transactions must hY5onnected in the sense of 
being parts of a preconceived plan. 60 The~ncil'jf gued that this connection 
between the transactions was lacking in the case of his client. 
Beyer I A who delivered the judgement opposed to this line of argumentation. 
His position was based on the English case of Crossland v Hawkins.61 
In Hawkins' case it had to be considered if it was necessary in order to constitute 
an "arrangement" within s 397 that the whole of the matter should have been in 




1963 (3) SA 863. 
ibid at 871. 
Crossland (Inspector of Taxes) v Hawkins [1961] 2 All ER 812 at 817. 
\ 
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' .. I do not think that the language of s 397 requires that the 
whole of the eventual arrangement must be in contemplation from 
the very outset. . . . Even were it otherwise, I think that there is 
sufficient unity about the whole matter to justify its being called an 
arrangement for this purpose, because the ultimate object is to 
secure for somebody money free from what would otherwise be the 
burden or the full burden of sunax. Merely because the final step 
to secure this objective is left unresolved at ihe outset, and 
decided on later, does not seem to me to rob the scheme of 
necessary unity to justify its being called an "arrangement".' 
Beyer JA furthermore quoted Watermeyer J, who had delivered the Special 
Court Decision of Meyerowitzs case: 
'The word "scheme" is a wide term and I think that there can be 
little doubt that it is sufficiently wide to cover a series of transactions 
such as those mentioned above. ' 
Both quotations were accepted by Beyer J A in Meyerowitz v CIR. It follows 
therefore that in order to constitute a scheme there must be a unity between the 
. transactions. It is not necessary that the transactions must be part of a 
\preconceived plan in order to form a scheme. The different steps taken must be 
so connected that in retrospective analysis they result in tax avoidance. 
62 Section 397 reads as follows: 
(1) Where, by virtue or in consequence of any settlement to which this 
Chapter applies and during the life of the settlor, any income is paid to or for 
the benefit of a child of the settlor in any year of assessment, the income shall, 
if at the commencement of that year the child was an infant and unmarried, be 
· treated for all the purposes of this Act as the income of the settlor for that year 
and not as the income of any other person. 
Section 403 is a definition section, and provides among other things: 
"settlement" includes any disposition, trust, convenant, agreement, arrangement 
or transfer of assets. 
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In the case of CIR v Louw63 the court had to decide whether the lapse of time 
could be a fatal interruption between different steps of a series of transactions. 
The facts of the case, in short, were the following. A firm of civil engineers had 
changed their form of business from a partnership into a company. Some five 
years after incorporation the company made loans to the directors. The 
Commissioner argued that the lending of moneys to directors was an integral 
part of the original scheme to incorporate the partnership. 
It was held by Corbett JA that the loans to the directors created an independent 
transaction. 64 The granting of the loans was neither an integral part of the 
incorporation nor necessary for the formation of the company. 
The lapse of time is no fatal interruption as long as . there is sufficient unity 
between the ultimate step and what had gone before. The series of transactions 
will still be part and parcel of a single scheme. Only when this unity is lacking 
each transaction must be looked at on its own and each is capable of being hit by 
s 103. This unity was lacking in Louw's case. 
It is noteworthy that the new anti-avoidance provision of the V.A.T.- Act might 
be of some guidance. Following the recommendation of the Margo-Commission65 an 
additional anti-avoidance provision has been introduced withs 73 of the Value-Added Tax Act of 
1991. The new anti-avoidance provision s 73 of the Value-Added Tax Act of 1991 





1983 (3) SA 551. 
ibid at 572. , 
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY into the TAX STRUCTURE OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA para 27.29. 
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(2) For the purpose of this section -
, • scheme' includes any transaction, operation, scheme or understanding (whether 
enforceable or not) including all steps and transactions by which it is carried into etTect; 
It is submitted that this new definition is wider in terminology66 than the old s 
103. However the terms transaction, operation or scheme in s 103 have 
sufficiently covered every form of arrangement in the past. There were no 
reported cases of taxpayers that could successfully argue that their 
• arrangements' would not fall under one of these three expressions. Each of 
these words has a wide ambit and there are very few activities of a taxpayer 
which will not be appropriately described by one or the other. 67 It is submitted 
therefore that the new definition in the V.A. T.- Act will hardly distinguish itself 
from the old definition. A possible field of application might be unenforceable 
arrangements. To be of any practical value the hurdle of evidence has to be 
overcome first. This hurdle could prove insurmountable for the Commissioner. 
It is therefore submitted that the new definition in the V. A. T. - Act will not 
influence the existing broad application of s 103. 
(ii) entered into or carried out 
The transaction, operation or scheme must have been entered into or carried 
out. The utilization of two different verbs lead in the case of Ovenstone v SIR68 




The terminology of the second part of this definition is absolutely identical to s 
99 of the New Zealand tax-avoidance provision. See Appendix II for the exact 
wording of s 99. 
Commissioner of Taxes v Perera 1976 (2) 653 at 658 [RAD]. 
1980 (2) SA 721 (AD). 
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the time when a scheme is formulated. 69 At the time of formulation there was 
no intention / purpose of the taxpayer to avoid tax. Only when the scheme was 
implemented the taxpayer had the purpose of tax avoidance. 
This approach of Meyerowitz, who represented the taxpayer, was rejected by 
Trollip JA:70 
" .. the question whether or not the scheme in question is hit ... must 
be answered by reference to the effect and purpose of the scheme and 
the circumstances surrounding it at the time it is implemented or 
carried out, and not at the time it was formulated, ie conceived, 
decided or agreed upon, or otherwise evolved. " 
Trollip JA continues that it is only at the moment when a scheme is implemented 
or carried out that it becomes a practical reality for the fiscus. He then carries 
on:71 
True, s 103(1) repeatedly speaks of "any transaction, operation or 
scheme entered into or carried out". But "entered into" there does 
not mean "formulated" in the above-mentioned sense72• Because of its 
context it has, I think, a connotation of implementation that is similar 
to "carried out". Probably both expressions were used because it was 
considered that "carried out" is more appropriate to connote the 
implementation. of a "scheme", while "entered into" is more apposite 
to connote the implementation (ie the taxpayer's actually engaging 
in) of a "transaction" or "operation" - cf The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary sv "entered into", "transaction", and "operation ". That 
approach is supported by the Afrikaans text - "'n transaksie, 
handeling of skema aangegaan, verrig of uitgevoer". It will be 





ibid at 723. 
ibid at 732. 
ibid at 732. 
Above, at p. 732, Trollip spoke of "formulate" as i.e. conceived, decided or 
agreed upon, or otherwise evolved. 
"· 
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appositeness of each of them to each of their respective preceding 
subject-nouns is most striking; " 'n transaksie aangegaan, handeling 
verrig, skema uitgevoer". · 
It follows therefore that "entered into" has a connotation of implementation 
similar to "carried out". A scheme will be looked at with regard to effect and 
purpose at the time of implementation and not at the time of formulation. 
The circumstances surrounding the scheme must also be considered. In Hicklin 
v SIR73 the counsel's contention that the whole respondents conduct must be seen 
as a scheme was rejected. Nevertheless the court held that even if a single 
agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme the circumstances of 
each case have to be looked at: 74 
'That does not mean, however, that the RN [Ryan Nigel]75 agreement 
must be looked at with blinkers on. Indeed, s 103(1) itself enjoins the 
respondent, and hence any coun seized with the problem, to have 
regard to "the circumstances under which the transaction, operation 
or scheme was entered into or carried out".' 
The first element has to be understood very widely in order to give the anti -
avoidance provision a broad application. With regard to time, subsection (1) 
expressly provides that the transaction, operation or scheme might have been 
entered into or carried out before or after the commencement of this Act. 
Furthermore, the alienation of property can be subject of a transaction, operation 
or scheme. In the following discussion I will refer to transaction, operation or 




1980 (1) SA 481. 
ibid at 492. 
Own italics by author. 
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b) Second Element 
The transaction must have the effect of avoiding or postponing liability 
for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof. The anti-avoidance 
provision does not only strike at the avoidance of tax but also at the 
mere postponement and reduction of tax. 76 The words "reducing the 
amount" in s 90 of Act 31 of 1941 mean reducing the amount of tax 
from what it ought to be in the tax year under consideration. The 
second necessary element requires an effect of the avoidance or 
postponement of tax liability or the reduction of the amount thereof on 
any tax imposed by this Act. It is important to notice that the effect 
must be one on ' this' Act or any previous Income Tax Act. 77 The 
wording in sub-section ( 1) makes it clear that one has to distinguish 
between effect and purpose. It will be shown later that the purpose of 
the transaction might have been to avoid, for eg., transfer duty or 
value-added tax (V.A.T.) or any other tax administered by the 
Commissioner. 
(i) taxes imposed 
The effect of the transaction must be one on taxes imposed by the Income Tax 
. Act. Taxes imposed by the Income Tax Act are Normal Tax, Non Resident 





Commissioner of Taxes v Perera 1976 (2) 653 at 658 [RAD). 
With· this' Act the Income Tax Act No.58 of 1962 in force is meant. 
Huxham, Keith / Haupt, Phillip, Notes on South African Income Tax , 11 
ed 1992 p.2ff.; Meyerowitz and Spiro, supra, (n14), para 1614. 
Undistributed Profits Tax (UPT) was abolished on 01/03/1990. 
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(ii) existence of income 
In order for the anti-avoidance provision to operate there has to be some kind 
of income in the hands of the taxpayer. 
It was expressed in CIR v King80 that a man can do a lot of things in order to 
avoid liability for tax: 
'Liability for the payment of some expected tax can, in a wide 
general sense, be avoided by a taxpayer if he abstains from 
earning any income and acquires none in any other way. This 
abstention from earning an income can be brought about by many 
kinds of operations or transactions. A man can, for instance, 
simply close down his business or resign from his employment, but 
it is absurd to suppose that the Legislature intended to impose a 
tax upon a man who enters into such a transaction or operation as 
if he had an income, which in/act he has not got, merely because 
his purpose was to avoid exposing himself to liability for taxation 
by having an income. ' 
To overcome these absurdities it was held in CIR v King that a distinction had 
to be made between a person who arranged his affairs so that he had no 
income at all and a person who escapes liability for income that would 
actually be his: 81 
' ... there is a real distinction between the case of a man who so 
orders his affairs that he has no income which would expose him 
to liability for income tax, and the case of a man who so orders 
80 
81 
CIR v King 1947 (2) SA 196 at 207 (AD). 
CIR v King 1947 (2) SA 196 at 210 (AD); see also D M Davis: Tax 
avoidance - the British example; in De Rebus 1981 347. 
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his affairs that he escapes from liability for taxation which he 
ought to pay upon the income which is in reality his. 
In King's case a father had sold to his son certain shares in a company. The 
Commissioner disregarded the sale and tried to tax the dividend income82 in 
the hands of the father. It was held that the sale of the shares was an 
alienation of capital and not of income. For this reason the transaction did not 
have the effect of avoiding liability for payment of tax or reducing its 
amount. For the sake of completeness it should be noted that the alienation of 
property was inserted into s 90 (nows 103) with s 17 of Act No. 78 of 1959. 
Nowadays the sale of the shares to a minor child would also fall foul of s 7 
(3). Any income received by a minor child as a result of a donation, 
settlement or other disposition will be deemed to be the parents income. 
(iii) meaning of 'liability' 
The transaction must have the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax 
on income or reducing the amount thereof. The liability concerned is the one 
of the taxpayer towards the Revenue authority. 83 
For a long time it has been unclear what was meant by 'liability'. Liability 
in s 103(1) does not refer to an existing one, for such a liability cannot be 
avoided by any transaction. 84 Watermeyer C I analysed in the King-case the 
meaning of' liability' with regard to s 90, the predecessor of s 103(1), and 





Dividend income it was held accrues uno ictu to the person entitled to the 
shares and not from day to day. 
Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 at 492. 
CIR v King 1947 (2) SA 196 at 207 (AD); Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 
at 492 (AD). 
CIR v King 1947 (2) SA 196 at 207 (AD). 
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'The expression "avoiding liability for the payment of any tax 
imposed by this Act or reducing the amount of any such tax" is 
ambiguous. The liability, which a transaction may be designed to 
avoid, may be a liability which was imposed upon a taxpayer in 
respect of a past accounting period, or it may be a liability which 
the taxpayer expects to incur in respect of the cu"ent accounting 
period, or it may be a liability which he expects to incur in respect 
of some future accounting period. The only liability for tax 
imposed by the Act which can exist at the time when a, transaction 
is entered into is a liability for a past accounting period, and with 
regard to that it is impossible to avoid it. 
Sec. 90 must therefore refer to anticipated liabilities for tax, either 
in respect of a cu"ent tax year or in respect of future years.' 
It is settled law by now that liability refers to 'anticipated liability'. The 
courts have approved this conclusion numerous times. 86 Uncertainty 
nevertheless arises as to the extent of anticipated liability. J1te courts have 
refused to draw an exact line of demarcation. 87 
'Now such a liability may vary from an imminent, cenain prospect 
to some vague, remote possibility . ... However, it is unnecessary 
and hence inadvisable to decide here whether a venical line 
should be drawn somewhere along that wide range of meanings in 
order to delimit the connotation of "an anticipated liability ". ' 
I concur with David Clegg who submitted that "some vague remote 
possibility" is referring to the time of a future receipt or accrual and not to the 




Smith v CIR 1964 (1) SA 324 at 333 (A); Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 at 
492 (AD). 
Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 at 492-3 (AD). 
David J M Clegg: Section 103(1) - "Freedom of choice" ; 1 SATJ (1986) 
224 at 226. 
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(iv) avoiding liability 
A detailed analysis of the words 'avoiding liability' can be found in the 
Australian case of Newton v COT: 89 The councel for the taxpayer submitted 
that, in s 260( c), the words ' liability imposed on any person' meant a liability 
which had already accrued; and that 'avoid' meant displace. 90 He concluded 
that in order to avoid tax liability , it must be an arrangement which sought to 
displace a liability which had already come home to a taxpayer - in respect of 
income which had already been received by him. 
The Court disagreed with the councel and came to the following interpretation 
of 'avoiding liability' :91 
'... the word "avoid" is used in its ordinary sense - in the sense in 
which a person is said to avoid something which is about to happen to 
him. He takes steps to get out of the way of it. It is this meaning of 
"avoid" which gives the clue to the meaning of "liability imposed". To 
"avoid a liability imposed" on you means to take steps to get out of the 
reach of a liability which is about to fall on you. ' 
In Smith v CIR this interpretation of the words 'avoiding liability' was 
confirmed by Steyn CJ. 92 He made reference to the Australian case and 








Newton and Others v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of 
Australia (1958] 2 All ER 759. 
s 260 (c) of the Commonwealth Income Tax and Social Services 
Contribution Assessment Act, 1931 - 1951; see wording in Appendix Il. 
ijewton and Others v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of 
Australia (1958] 2 All ER 759 at 763. 
'The ordinary natural meaning of avoiding liability for a tax on income is to 
get out of the way of, escape or prevent an anticipated liability. ' Smith v 
CIR 1964(1) SA 324 at 333 (A). 
Smith v CIR 1964(1) SA 324 at 333 (A). 
See the Afrikaans text of s 103 in the Appendix I. 
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'The Afrikaans rendering of the phrase is "wat die uitwerking 
het dat dit aanspreeklikheid vir die betaling van 'n belasting ... op 
inkomste vermy ". The ordinary meaning of "vermy" is "ontwyk" 
or "voorkom".' 
Our legislation hasn't seen a necessity yet to define liability. A different 
approach has been taken in New Zea.land. The equivalent to our general anti.-
avoidance provision in New Zea.land is s 99 of the Income Tax Act 1976. In 
subsection (I) "liability" is defined: 95 
For the purpose of this section -
"liability" includes a potential or prospective liability in respect of future income: 
It is admitted that a minimal effect is enough to satisfy the second 
requirement. In ITC 1178 the amounts saved by entering into a scheme were 
for the first year R 174,50 and the second year R 144. However it was held 
that this effect was enough for s 103 to apply. 
95 See section 99 in Appendix II. 
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c) The third requirement 
The transaction must have been entered into solely or mainly for the purpose of 
avoiding any tax by the Income Tax Act or any other law administered by the 
Commissioner. 
The purpose element will be discussed as the third element and not as the last of 
the four elements in order to point out the co-relationship between effect and 
purpose. 
(i) purpose 
It might well be that "effect" and "result" as retrospectively used in sub-section 
( 1) and ( 4) of s 103 have the same meaning, there is nevertheless a clear 
distinction between ' effect' and 'purpose'. Purpose is used in s 103 ( 1) with the 
meaning of the intention with which the transaction was entered into and not 
with the effect of the transaction. The intention or purpose of any particular 
transaction is a matter of fact. 96 
(ii) subjective or objective test 
In determining the purpose of a transaction it was argued by council in SIR v 
Gallagher 97 that the proper test to apply would be an 'objective' one. An 





SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971(3) SA 567 at S76 (AD); CIR v 
Richmond Estates (Pty) Ltd 19S6 (1) SA 602 at 606-7 (AD). 
1978 (2) SA 463 (AD). 
ibid at 471. 
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The contrary would be a ' subjective' test focusing on the purpose which those 
carrying out the scheme intend to achieve by means of the scheme. The courts 
have adopted the subjective test with the following argumentation:99 
Section 103 (1) draws a clear distinction between the 'effect' of a 
scheme and the 'purpose' thereof and this virtually rules out an 
interpretation which seeks to give 'purpose' an objective connotation 
and to equate it, more or less, to 'effect'. 100 
The proper test to be applied in the determination of the purpose of a 
transaction is accordingly a' subjective' test. 
The evidence of the taxpayer is in this regard of prime importance. 101 Such 
evidence is however not decisive. 102 The court is not bound to accept what a 
witness says in evidence, even under oath. 103 
In determining the purpose of a transaction Nicholas J held in ITC 1307 that 
despite the distinction between effect and purpose the effect of a scheme might 







SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth & Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 at 576; Glen Anil 
Development Corporation v SIR 1975 (4) SA 715 at 730 in regard to the 
similar wording of s 103 (2); SIR v Gallagher 1978 (2) SA 463 at 471 (AD); 
Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 at 493 (AD). 
SIR v Gallagher 1978 (2) SA 463 at 471 (AD). 
ibid. 
Glen Anil Development Corporation v SIR 1975 (4) SA 715 at 730 (AD). 
SIR v Gallagher 1978 (2) SA 463 at 472 (AD); ITC 1307 (1979) 42 SATC 147 
at 154. 
ITC 1307 (1979) 42 SATC 147 at 150; The case is analysed in: (1981) 20 
Income Tax Reporter 87; see also Silk:e, South African Income Tax, para 19-
22, Fn 59. 
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'And · although the subsection distinguishes between the 
'effect' and the 'purpose' of a scheme, the effect of the scheme is of 
course not necessarily irreleyant to this part of the enquiry - the effect 
may in some circumstances tend to show what purpose the taxpayer 
had in mind. ' 
The fact that councel in Gallagher's case did not succeed with his attempt to 
apply an objective test did not prevent his final victory in the outcome of the 
case. The taxpayer had entered into a scheme with the sole intention to save 
estate duty. The purpose clause of s 103(1) at that time covered only transactions 
which were entered into for the sole or main purpose of avoiding income tax. 
Since the taxpayer could prove that his purpose was not to save income tax but 
estate duty the anti-avoidance provision was no longer applicable. 
In consequence of cases as Gallagher's or ITC 1307 the anti-avoidance provision 
of s 103(1) was amended. 105 , 106 It is submitted that Gallagher's case would now 
be covered by the amended s 103(1). 107 
The amendment took the following form. To begin with the purpose was no 
longer limited to the avoidance of income tax only but to all other laws 
administered by the Commissioner. The other laws administered by the 




Section 14 of the Amendment Act 101 of 1978. 
In similar Rhodesian cases as F v COT 1975 (4) SA 693 (R) or COT v Perera 
1976 (2) SA 653 (RAD) the taxpayers sole purpose was to save death duty. It 
was held that the Legislature, in attacking the evil of tax avoidance, could not 
possible have intended to leave unscathed taxpayers who frankly admit that the 
transaction, operation or scheme had as its sole or main purpose the avoidance, 
postponement or reduction of tax. 
Huxham/Haupt, supra, p 290. 
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added Tax (VAT) Act ; the Stamp Duties Act; the Sales Tax Act; the Transfer 
Duty Act and the Marketable Securities Act. 108 
In the second place the words 'sole or main' purpose were displaced by ' solely 
or mainly'. The meaning of this words will be looked at in the following 
paragraph. 
(iii) solely or mainly 
This criterion has experienced many changes in the history of the anti-avoidance 
provision. It is interesting to note that the first anti-avoidance provision, s 90 of 
Act 31 of 1941, only spoke of ... 'the purpose'. 109 In CIR v AH Kingll~ the 
council argued that s 90 spoke of 'the' instead of 'a' purpose. Ergo it. was 
concluded that s 90 did not include an incidental purpose but a dominant 
purpose. 
The first major change in wording came with the second amendment of s 90. lll 
The words 'the purpose' were replaced with 'the sole and main purpose'. 
Nicholas J gave the words 'main purpose' this following connotation: 112 
' 1he word 'ma,in' means principal, ma,jor, most imponant, and the 
ascenainment of a ma,in purpose involves a weighing against each 
other of the various purposes of a scheme. In a case such as the 
present, where at most two purposes have been suggested ra saving 
on income tax and a saving on estate duty), if one purpose 






Meyerowitz and Spiro, supra, (n14) 1614 A. 
See the complete text of s 90 of Act 31 of 1941 in the Appendix I. 
CIR v IHB King ; CIR v AH King 1947 SA 196 at 215 (AD). 
Section 17 of Act No 78 of 1959. For the detailed summary of all amendments 
of s 90 of Act 31 of 1941 ands 103 of Act 58 of 1962 see Appendix I. 
ITC 1307 (1979) 42 SATC 147 at 153. 
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The present wording 'solely or mainly' was introduced with Section 14 of Act 
No 101 of 1978 in response to the SIR v Gallagher113 as mentioned above. The 
wording ' solely and mainly' is narrower than ' sole and main' purpose. 114 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'solely' as: 115 Only, merely, exclusively, 
entirely, altogether. 
'Mainly' stands for: 116 For the most part, in the main, as the chief thing, 
chiefly, principally. 
The exact meaning of these two words in the context of s 103(1) is not quite 
clear. It was held in SBI v Lourens Erasmus (Eiendoms) BPK117 that 'mainly' 
lays down a purely quantitative standard of more than 50 per cent and the use of 
the alternative 'solely' does not derogate therefrom. 118 This interpretation it was 
contended119 would make the word 'solely' superfluous and meaningless. It 
would disrespect the cardinal rule of interpretation that a statute should be 
interpreted and construed in such a way that, if it can be prevented, no clause, 
sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant. 120 
Despite this contention the court held that draftsmen often use a number of terms 
without troubling about the question of overlapping, instead of relying on a 
single general expression. 121 This is certainly true for the wording of an 










SIR v Gallagher 1978 (2) SA 463. 
Huxham / Haupt, supra, at 290. 
The Oxford English Dictionary Vol. X. 
ibid Vol VI. 
1966(4) SA 434 at 442. 
In SBI v Lourens Erasmus the court interpreted s 51 (f) of Act 43 of 1955 
w,hich dealt with the question if net profits derived "solely or mainly" from 
dividends. 
SBI v Lourens Erasmus 1966(4) SA 434 at 441. 
Loewenstein v COT 1956 (4) SA 766 at 770-1 (FC). 
SBI v Lourens Erasmus 1966(4) SA 434 at 442. 
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of the draftsmen. The court then continued to give an explanation why the word 
'solely' has been introduced by the legislature: 122 
'Aangesien die woord 'hoofsaaklik', in teenstelling met die woord 
'uitsluitlik', die bestaan van twee of meer vergelykbare groottes 
veronderstel, is dit goed denkbaar dat die woord 'uitsluitlik' in 
an.51 (I) minstens ex abundanti cautela ingevoeg was om 'n 
moontlike opvatting dat 'n maatskappy wat inkomste uitsluitlik uit 
diwidende verkry, nie 'n maatskappy is wat dit slegs hoofsaaklik 
daaruit verkry nie, te voorkom.' 
This interpretation of 'uitsluitlik' was made in context to art 51 (t). A similar 
interpretation is possible for s 103(1). Meyerowitz presumes that the word 
'solely' should prevent an argument that where the sole purpose is tax 
avoidance, it cannot be termed a main purpose. 123 Consequently the word 
'solely' is redundant since it is enough that the purpose is mainly tax avoidance. 
It is submitted that the change in wording lightened the taxpayer's burden in 
discharging the onus. 124 This will be shown later in context with s103(2) and the 




ibid at 441. 
Meyerowitz and Spiro, supra, {nl4), para 1618 Fn 22. _ 
(1978) 27 The Taxpayer 111 at 112-3; Theo van Wyk: Section 103(1): Hicklin 
v SIR, De Rebus 1980 p 32 at 33. 
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(iv) Presumption 
Section 103(4)(a) embodies a presumption that a transaction was entered into or 
carried out solely or mainly for the purpose of avoiding tax. The section reads as 
follows: 
(4) Any decision of the Commissioner under subsection (1), (2) or (3) shall 
be subject to objection and appeal, and whenever in proceedings relating 
thereto it is proved that the transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or 
change in shareholding or members' interests in question would result in the 
avoidance or the postponement of liability for payment of any tax, duty or 
levy imposed by this Act or any previous Income Tax Act or any other law 
administered by the Commi~ioner, or in the reduction of the amount 
thereof, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved -
(a) in the case of any transaction, operation or scheme, that it was 
· entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purposes of 
the avoidance or the postponement of such liability or the 
reduction of the amount of such liability; or 
(b) in the case of any such agreement or change in shareholding or 
members' interests, that it has been entered into or effected 
solely or mainly for the purpose of utilizing the assessed 1~ 
or balance of assessed loss in question in order to avoid or 
postpone such liability or to reduce the amount thereof. 
The section 103(4) expressly provides that any decision of the Commissioner 
under s 103(1) shall be subject to objection and appeal. Regardless to this 
Corbett JA held: 125 
'The effect of this is, although a major criterion prescribed by s 103 
(1) is the 'opinion of the Secretary', this does not debar the Special 
Court from re-hearing the whole case and, if it so decides, 
substituting its own decision for that of the Secretary.' 
Of more practical relevance is the presumption in connection with the purpose 
requirement which s 103(4) contains. Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied 
that any transaction would result in the avoidance or postponement of tax it is 
125 SIR v Gallagher 1978 (2) SA 463 at 470 (AD). 
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presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the transaction was entered into 
solely or mainly for the avoidance of tax. The sub-section goes even further as it 
includes a presumption in respect of s 103(2) as well. The utilization of assessed 
losses will be dealt with at a later stage. 
It is noteworthy that s 103(4) speaks of 'result' of a transaction instead of 
'effect'. It is submitted that both words have the same meaning in this context. 
A possible explanation for the appearance of the word 'result' instead of effect is 
that the term not only appears in s 103(2) but also in a simular presumption in 
the first anti-avoidance provision s 90. 126 
The presumption places a heavy burden of proof on the taxpayer .127 However the 
question of onus will be discussed at a later stage. 
(v) relevance of time for the purpose element 
Whether or not a scheme is hit by s 103 (1) must be answered by reference to 
the effect and purpose of the scheme and the circumstances surrounding it at the 
time it is implemented or carried out, and not at the time it was formulated, ie 
conceived, decided or agreed upon, or otherwise evolved. 128 Trollip JA held in 





' Provided that any decision of the Commissioner under this section shall be 
subject to objection and appeal, and in any proceedings relating thereto, 
whenever it is proved that the transaction or operation in question would result 
in the avoidance of liability for the payment of any such tax, or in the reduction 
of the amount thereof, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that 
the transaction or operation was entered into or carried out for the purpose of 
avoiding such liabilty or of reducing such amount. 
For the complete text of s 90 see Appendix I. 
De Koker / Urquhart, Income Tax in South Africa, para 26-19. 
Ovenstone v SIR 1980 (2) SA 721 at 732; Meyerowitz and Spiro, supra, (n14), 
para 1619. 
Ovenstone v SIR 1980 (2) SA 721 at 732. 
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even if the purpose or effect of the scheme when it is 
formulated is not to avoid liability for tax, it may have that effect or 
that may become one of the taxpayer's main purposes when he 
subsequently carries it out, thereby rendering s 103(1) applicable if 
its other requirements are fulfilled. ' 
Beyer J A made in Meyerowitz v CIR the following statement in context to 
time:130 
'It is true that the Special Court found that when it [the company]131 
was formed there was no purpose of tax avoidance. But although it 
may have come upon the scene with good intentions, it ceased almost 
at once to be an innocent bystander. ' 
While investigating the purpose of the taxpayer one has to look at his purpose at 
the time of the implementation and not at the time of formulation ~f the 
transaction, operation or scheme. The change of intention from formulating a 
sound business transaction towards a scheme of tax avoidance makes the 
taxpayer fall foul of s 103. Hypothetically the vice versa situation - a change of 
intention from tax avoidance towards a sound business transaction - must lead to 
a case where the purpose-element is not fulfilled and s 103 is no longer 
applicable. This hypothetical situation will cause the taxpayer a 'nightmare' as 








The question might be asked whether the distinction drawn by the Courts 
between effect and purpose is a necessary one or just creates space for loopholes. 
It appears that the distinction between the two terms is of no real help. While 
analysing the underlying principle it seems that everything boils down to the 
question of causation. However it may be, this question has to be left open at 
this point. As long as the Legislature is not acting the distinction between effect 
and purpose is to be respected. 
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d) The fourth requirement: normality 
In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard to the circumstances, a transaction 
must have been: 
(i) entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would 
not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a 
transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, 
operation or scheme in question; or 
(ii) created rights or obligations which would not normally be created 
between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, 
operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction operation or 
scheme in question. 
(i) normality requirement as the crux of s 103(1) 
The normality-requirement is the crux of the anti-avoidance provision. Only if a 
transaction, operation or scheme is abnormal will it be hit by s 103, presuming 
that all the other elements are also fulfilled .. 
Some authors consider the purpose-requirement as the crux of s 103.132 I 
respectfully disagree with De Koker / Urquhart. It is correct that the purpose-
element also has to be fulfilled in order for s 103 to apply. 133' Nevertheless the 
section can't apply if the taxpayer frankly admits that his purpose was to avoid 




De Koker / Urquhart, supra, para 26-18. 
Only if "all" four elements are fulfilled is s 103 of application: Hicklin v SIR 
1980 (1) SA 481 at 491 (AD). 
Broomberg, Tax Strategy at 213. 
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'The first one of these defences [against s 103(1))135 infuriates the 
Commissioner. 'Thus, a taxpayer can nakedly confess that a 
transaction was entered into solely for the purpose of avoiding tax, 
and yet he can pip the Commissioner, if the taxpayer can demonstrate 
that the transaction which he entered into did not manifest any 
abnormalities, either in respect of the rights and obligations which 
were created, or in regard to the manner in which it was entered into 
or carried out. ' 
The normality-requirement accordingly contains an important limitation for the 
application of the anti-avoidance section. If the means and manner are those 
normally employed in entering into or carrying out a transaction, operation or 
scheme of the same nature, and if the rights and obligations created are those 
which would normally be created under such a transaction, operation or scheme, 
between persons dealing at arm's length, the section would not apply, even if, of 
set purpose, a liability for income tax is being avoided or postponed or the 
ount thereof reduced.136 
Interestingly enough the normality-requirement was not included in the tax 
avoidance provision when it was enacted in 1941. Only in 1959 did it become 
part and parcel of the anti-avoidance provision. 
135 Own words. 
136 See i.e. the recent decision of ITC 1542 were it was held that where rights and 
obligations created were normal for person's dealing at arm's length no further 
investigation into the requirements of s 103(l)(ii) is necessary as s103 can't 
apply any more. 
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137 The normality-requirement has been introduced to overcome the absurdities 
and unsatisfactory results as shown in the King-case138• Schreiner J A made the 
following remark: 139 
'Jr is intended, I think, to deal with cases in which the 
Commissioner, as representing the fiscus, is properly aggrieved by 
a transaction or operation designed to enable one of the parties 
thereto to escape tax/ The Commissioner is not properly aggrieved 
merely because at a stage before income has accrued to a taxpayer 
it might have been predicted with corzfidence, amounting even to 
certainty, that if the taxpayer took no steps in the matter such 
income would accrue to him, and because he then takes the 
avoiding steps. Butvthe Commissioner would be properly aggrieved 
if a transaction or operation were entered into which prevemed 
income from accruing to the taxpayer while leaving him in the 
position· of one to whom the income would normally and naturally 
accrue. The section is not, in my opinion, designed to implement 
the expectations, however reasonable, of the Commissioner that 
there will be no change in the taxpayer's affairs which will result in 
him getting less income; it is designed to meet the Commissioner's 
objections to the creation of abnormal or unnatural situations, to 
the detriment of the fiscus( Now normally and naturally the owner 
of an income-producing asset receives the income and the labourer 
receives the reward of his labour. Any departure from this order of 




The normality-requirement was introduced by section 17 of Act 78 of 1959. 
CIR v King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A). 
ibid at 216 (A). 
I 
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subject of legitimate objection by the Commissioner, which is met 
by the machinery of the section. ' 
The abnormality of means, manners, rights and obligations, is a matter of 
opinion of the Commissioner, but in terms of sub-section ( 4) his decision is 
subject to objection and appeal. 
(ii) observations out of fficklins case 
In Hicklin v SIR 140 three observations are made by Trollip J A with regard to s 
103 (1) (i) and (ii) of the Act. The first observation is that the inquiry about the 
normality of a transaction which is an agreement should start with the 
arms'length criterion postulated in para (ii). 141 
'A few preliminary observations about paras (i) and (ii) of the sub-
section. When the "transaction, operation or· scheme" is an 
agreement, ... , it is important, I think, to determine first whether it 
was one concluded "at arm's length". That is the criterion postulated 
in para (ii). For "dealing at arms' length" is a useful and often easily 
determinable P.remisefrom which to start the inquiry. It connotes that 
each pany is independent of the other and, in so dealing, will strive 
to get the utmost possible advantage out of the transaction for 
himself. Indeed, in the Afrikaans text the corresponding phrase is 
"die uiterste voorwaardes beding". Hence, in an at arms'length 
agreement the rights and obligations it creates are more likely to be 
· regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para 
(ii). And the means or manner employed in entering into it or 
140 
141 
Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 (AD); for a detailed analysis of the case see: 
Theo van Wyk,' Section 103(1) Hicklin v SIR', in: De Rebus 1980 32. 
ibid at 494-5. 
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carrying it out are more likely to be normal than abnormal in the 
sense envisaged by para (i).' 
The second observation of Trollip J A relates to the circumstances surrounding 
the transaction: 142 
'The next observation is that, when considering the normality of the 
rights or obligations so created or of the means or manner so 
employed, due regard has to be paid to the surrounding 
circwnstances. As already pointed out s 103 (1) itself postulates that. 
Thus, what may be normal because of the presence of circwnstances 
surrounding the entering into or carrying out of the agreement in one 
case, may be abnormal in an agreement of the same nature in 
another case because of the absence of such circwnstances.' 
Considering the facts of the Hicklin-case Trollip J A then held: 143 
'That does not mean, however, that the RN [Ryan Nigel]144 
agreement must be looked at with blinkers on. Indeed, s103(1) itself 
enjoins the respondent, and hence any Court seized with the problem, 
to have regard to " the circwnstances under which the transaction, 
operation or scheme was entered into or carried out".' 
His last observation is linked to the conclusion that normality or abnormality is 
mainly a matter of fact: 14S 
'The last observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality 
of such matters is mainly a factual one. The Court hearing the case 





ibid at 495. 
ibid at 492. 
Own italics. 
Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 at 95(AD). 
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starulards or by means of the expen or other evidence adduced 
thereanent by either party.' 
(iii) the arm's length test 
Following the observations of Trollip J A I will begin with the arm's length-
test. It is assumed that parties dealing at arm's length try to achieve the upmost 
possible advantage out of a transaction for themselves. Because each party knows 
what is best for itself the rights and obligations created will be regarded as 
normal. 
Section 103(3) especially includes a deeming provision which is concerned with 
the arm's length test. Where a South African resident or a company (which 
carries on business in the Republic) disposes of shares in a South African 
company to a non-South African party (either individual or company), the 
transaction will be deemed to have been not at arm's length and as a result of 
that to be abno~al. For the ease of reference will sub-section (3) be printed 
here. 
(3) For the p~ of sub-section (1) any transaction, operation or scheme (whether entered 
into or carried out before or after the commencement of the Act) whereby any person (other 
than a company) who is ordinary resident or carrying on business in the Republic, or any 
company registered or carrying on business in the Republic, has disposed of shares held by 
such person or such company in any company registered or incorporated in the Republic to 
any person (other than a company) not ordinary resident nor carrying on business in the 
Republic, or to any company registered outside the Republic, shall, unless it is proved to the 
satisfaction of the Commissioner that the parties are independent persons dealing at arm's 
length with each other, be deemed to be a transaction, operation or scheme entered into or 
carried out by meam or in a manner not normally employed in the entering into or carrying 
out of such a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or 
scheme in question. 
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This section was introduced to aid the Commissioner in his fight against tax 
avoidance. It is focused against foreigners and foreign companies that are 
involved in tax avoidance. As this is only a deeming provision and not a fiction 
it is up to the foreigner or the foreign company to prove that the parties involved 
were dealing at arm's length and consequently that the transaction was a normal 
one. 
Still, it must be remembered that the deeming provision only covers the 
involvement of foreigners and is therefore not applicable to transactions between 
individuals that . are residents of the Republic or companies that carry on 
business in the Republic. 
It is submitted that the arm's length-test is a useful and easily determinable 
premise from which to start. However, not all parties have an arm's length 
relationship with each other. 146 In SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert a 
/ 
I 
professional partnership was converted into an unlimited liability company, the 
partners being the sole shareholders of the company. Ogilvie Thompson C J 
made this remark about 'dealing at arm's length': 147 
'The criterion of "persons dealing at arm's length II mentioned in sec. 
103(1)(ii) is, however, not easy of application in a case such as the 
present. For the section enjoins the application of that criterion in 
relation to a transaction, operation or scheme II of the nature of the 
transaction operation or scheme in question 11• Yet the Court is in the 
present case ex hypothesi concerned with partners who have, in the 
146 
147 
Trevor Emslie, 'Dealing at arm's length', (1988) 3 Tax Planning 127 .. 
1971 (3) SA 567 at 574 (AD). 
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circumstarices outliried above, made over their practice, not to an 
independent third party with whom they would ordinarily deal "at 
arm's length", but to an unlimited company of which they are the 
sole shareholders and directors and whereof they have full and 
complete control. ' 
In the case of CIR v Louw the court also dealt with the conversion of a 
partnership into a limited company .148 After having quoted the passage from 
Ogilvie Thompson C J above, Corbett J A continued: 149 
'In such a case should the Coun, in applying the 
"normality "yardstick, take account of the special relationship 
between the erstwhile panners and the company which they have 
formed, or ignore it and apply the yardstick as though the company 
were a stranger? I do not see how the Coun can ignore this special 
relationship and yet give proper effect to the coricluding words of s 
103(1)(ii), viz "under a transaction, operation or scheme of the 
nature of the transaction , operation or scheme in question " (my 
italics). For it is of the very nature of the iricorporation scheme that 
the company to which the practice is sold by the panners will have as 
its shareholders and directors the self-same panners and will be 
controlled by them. Those are the realities of the situation. ' 
148 
149 
1983(3) SA 551 (AD). 
ibid at 574. 
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Corbett J A then goes on that despite the fact that there was an identity· of 
persons involved - the former partners now being the sole shareholders of the 
company - there was still an arm's length transaction: 150 
'Moreover, it must be borne in mind that in a case such as the 
present the transaction is a multipanite one to which all the partners 
and the company are panners; and each partner contracts both with 
the company and his fellow panners and seeks to extract from the 
transaction the best possible advantage for himself. ' 
I humble submit that this is not correct. The reason therefore is the following. A 
party is at arm's length with another if he is away from close contact or 
familiarity.151 Where parties stand in an ongoing relationship with each other 
they are no longer at arm's length. Partners in a partnership that is subsequently 
converted into a company are in an ongoing relationship and are therefore not in 
an arm's length position. In the result however the case is - decided correctly, as 
even persons not dealing at arm's length can still enter into ' normal' bona fide 
business transactions. 
(iv) circumstances 
Taking the second observation of the Hicklin-judgement into account one has to 
consider the circumstances of the case. This criterion has caused a lot of head-
aches as it makes the normality-requirement ambiguous. It is logically 
inconsistent to apply an objective test by looking at rights and obligations created 
at arm's length and then to take the peculiar facts of a scheme into account. 
150 
151 
ibid at 574. 
Oxford Dictionary Volume I. 
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Silke suggests that the circumstances should only be taken into consideration in 
para (i) and not in para (ii): 152 
'How can a transaction be required to be "at arm's length" having 
regard to the circumstances that are anything but "at arm's length"? 
For example, having regard to the relationship between a man and 
his company or between a man and his son, many features of a 
transaction may be quite normal that would be abnormal between 
independent parties. The view that the phrase "having regard to the 
circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was 
entered into or carried out" refers only to s 103(1)(b)(i) and not(ii) 
would resolve the problem, since the question would then merely be 
whether the rights or obligations concerned are normal as between 
persons dealing at "arm's length". Unfortunately, however, the 
present wording of s 103(1)(b) makes it altogether clear that the 
quoted phrase applies both to s 103 (l)(b)(i) and (ii).' 
Silke himself points out that the present wording demands the circumstances to 
be considered both for the means and manner in which a transaction is entered 
into and for the rights and obligations created in an arm's length transaction. 
A possible solution might be found in the new s 73 of the V.A.T.-Act. The 
section reads as follows: 
152 Silke, supra, para 19-29. 
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Schemes for obtaining undue tax benefits 
73.(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Act, whenever the 
Commissioner is satisfied that any scheme (whether entered into or carried 
out before or after the commencement of this Act, and including a scheme 
involving the alienation of property) -
(a) has been entered into or carried out which has the effect of 
granting a tax benefit to any person; and 
(b) having regard to the substance of the scheme -
(i) was entered into or carried out by means or in a 
manner which would not normally be employed for 
bona fide business purposes, other than the obtaining 
of the tax benefit; or 
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would not 
normally be created between persons dealing at arm's 
length; and 
(c) was entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the 
purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, 
the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax imposed by this 
Act, and the amount thereof, as if the scheme had not been entered into or 
carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case be deems 
appropriate for the prevention or dirninuation of such tax benefit. 
It will be seen that the 'circumstances' -requirement has been substituted by the 
'substance'-requirement. The introduction of a new anti-avoidance provision is 
to be appreciated. The, section is a direct response to some of the 
recommendations made by the Margo-Commission. 153 
(v) transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, 
operation or scheme in question 
Another difficulty within the normality-test is the term 'transaction, operation 
or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in 
question'. This difficulty has been addressed by Corbett J A in Louw's case: 154 
153 
154 
The Insertion of general anti-avoidance provisions in all fiscal legislations, para 
27.29 
CIR v Louw 1983(3) SA 551 at 574 (AD). 
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'I do llOt see how the Court can ig1UJre this special relationship (llOt 
an ann's length relationship)155 and yet give proper effect to the 
. concluding words of s 103(1)(ii), viz "under a transaction, operation 
or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in 
question ". ' 
De Koker and Urquhard suggest solving the problem by giving the words "of the 
nature of the transaction, operation or scheme" in para (ii) a certain 
connotation: 156 
'The only possible method of resolving the ambiguity, it is 
considered, lies in regarding the words "of the nature of the 
transaction, operation or scheme", as referring in general terms to 
the transaction, which is implicitly regarded as taking place at ann 's 
length.' 
This ambiguity was solved in s 73 of the V.A.T.-Act by simply omitting the 
term 'transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation 
or scheme in question'. 
(vi) ordinary busin~ man-test 
Thus, if the arm's length test is not the standard test for normality which other 
test should be applied? In ITC 1113 the 'ordinary busin~ man '-test has been 
applied by Watermeyer J. The test has been slightly modified for s 73 of the 
155 
156 
Own italics by author. 
De Koker & Urquhart, supra, para 
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V.A.T.-Act. The relevant test is now the 'bona fide business purpose'-test. As 
this section is a quite young one it first has to earn its merits in practice. 
It is noteworthy that the tax planning branch has long ago adopted the 'bona fide 
business purpose' -test. Broomberg in his book on tax strategy made this remark 
with regard to a successful defence against an attack under the normality-
requirement: 157 
'From the point of view of the tax planner, however, the approach is 
clear. If a transaction is proposed, which will have the effect of tax 
avoidance, and the planner is relying on the normalcy test to defeat 
an attack by the Commissioner, the planner should be able to account 
for each right and each obligation created by the transaction, by way 
of providing a sound business purpose for such right or obligation. 
The planner should test his proposed contract by asking the following 
question: leaving aside altogether for the moment the tax effects of 
this panicular clause, can the provisions of this clause be justified on 
commercial grounds? A negative answer must make the transaction 
vulnerable to attack under the provision of s 103(1), if all other 
requirements of the section are present. ' 
157 Broomberg, supra, at 213-214. 
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5 Utilisation of assessed losses s 103(2) 
The Income Tax Act entertains with s 20 a provision that allows the taxpayer to 
set off an assessed loss against income from trade under certain conditions. An 
assessed loss occurs where the allowable deductions under ss 11 - 19 in one year 
exceed the income of the taxpayer. 158 Section 20 further provides that the 
assessed loss may be carried forward to the next or subsequent tax years in order 
to be set off against income in that year. The following constellations are 
possible in regard to the balance of the assessed loss. 
'Whe-never there has been a trading loss in the tax year, or where there 
has been a balance of assessed loss brought forward from the previous 
year, there has to be a determination of the balance of the assessed loss to 
be carried forward into the next year. There may have been a profit in the 
tax year, but not large enough to obliterate the balance of assessed loss 
carried over from the previous year. Then the -new balance of assessed loss 
will be smaller than the previous o-ne. If there has been a working loss in 
the tax year the balance to go forward will be increased. If there has been 
no previous balance the assessed loss in the tax year will be the balance of 
assessed loss carried forward. '159 
158 
159 
Section 20 (2) provides a definition of assessed loss: 
(2) For the purpose of this section "assessed loss" means any amount, as 
established to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, by which the deductions 
admissible under sections eleven to nineteen, inclusive, or the corresponding 
provisions of any previous Income Tax Act exceeds the income in respect of 
which they are so admissible, or, if the context so requires, means an assessed 
loss as determined under the provisions of section thirty or the corresponding 
provisions of any previous Income Tax Act. 
CIR v Louis Zinn Organisation (Pty) Ltd 1958 (4) SA 477 at 485. 
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It should be noted that the carry forward is from "the preceding year". Where in 
a particular year no balance of assessed loss is determined in preparation for 
future use, there cannot be, in the next year, a looking back to the past. 160 It 
follows that if the business is making no profits a large assessed loss is built up. 
This does not concern Revenue as far as individuals are concerned because 
assessed losses are not transferable. But where on the other hand a company is 
involved is the situation a different one. A company is a separate entity distinct 
from its members. 161 Where a company has accumulated an assessed loss it can 
be ' transferred' by passing ownership in the company through the sale of the 
shares. 162 The new owner of the company then channels income through the 
acquired company in order to absorb the assessed loss. This "trafficking" in 
companies with accumulated assessed losses is the raison d'etre for the 
enactment of s 103(2). The sub-section reads as follows: 
(l)Wbenever the Commissioner is satisfied that any agreement affecting any 
company or any change in the shareholding in any company or in the members' interest in 
any company which is a close corporation, as a direct or indirect result of which income has 
been received by or has accrued to that company during any year of ~ent, has at any 
time before or after the commencement of the Income Tax Act, 1946, been entered into or 
effected by any person solely or mainly for the purpose of utilizing any ~ I~ or any 
balance of ~ I~ incurred by the company, in order to avoid liability on the part of 
that company or any other person for the payment of any tax, duty or levy on income, or to 
reduce the amount thereof, the set-off of any such ~ I~ or balance of ~ I~ 




New Urban Properties v SIR 1966 (1) SA 217 at 224 (AD). 
Salomon v Salomon & Company Ltd [1897] AC 22; Cilliers and Benade, 
Company Law 4ed. at 10. 
Donald M Steward, 'The Prohibition of Tax Avoidance: an Evaluation of s 103 
of the South African Income Tax Act (No 58 of 1962), in CILSA 1970 168 at 
189. 
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The section can be dissected into three parts. Its three parts have been listed in 
ITC 1123 as follows: 163 
'An assessed loss must be disallowed by the Commissioner if he is satisfied 
a) that any agreement has been concluded affecting any company, or that a 
change in the shareholding of a company has taken place; 
b) that as a direct or indirect result thereof income has been received by or 
accrued to that company during the year of assessment; and 
c) that the agreement was concluded or the change in shareholding effected 
solely or mainly for the purpose of utilizing any assessed loss incu"ed by 
the company in order to avoid liability on the part of the company or any 
other person for the payment of income tax. 
a) First requirement 
For the first requirement to be fulfilled there has to be an agreement affecting 
the company or a change in shareholding. Although the section applies in the 
alternative it is in practice the change in shareholding which is more common. 164 
The enquiry whether or not a change in share-holding has taken place is a factual 
one. 165 The change of the members' interests in a close corporation additionally 




ITC 1123 (1968) 31 SATC 48 at 49-50; see also ITC 1388 (1983) 46 SATC 
126 at 130-131. 
Only the Glen Anil case is concerned with an arrangement while all other cases 
deal with a change in shareholding. For a detailed list of cases see: De Koker, 
A.P. & Urquhart,supra, Vol I, para 26-23 Fn. 110. 
ITC 1123 (1969) 31 SATC 48 at 52. 
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(i) change in shareholding necessary? 
Prior to its amendment there existed some doubt whether the section could be 
invoked where there was no change in shareholding. 166 The wording of the 
corresponding s 90 (l)(b) of the 1941 Act read like this: 167 
"Whenever the CnmmiAAioner is satisfied... that any agreement or any 
change in shareholding in any company, as a direct or indirect result of 
which income has been recieved by or has accrued ... to any company. 
The words "any company" have been replaced by the words "that company". 
This change in wording created an obscurity in the s 90 (1) (b) which has been 
carried forward in the re-enactment of that section by s 103 (2). 168 
'The words "that company" clearly refer to the company in the 
shareholding in which there was a change and, as the words "any 
agreement" are not related to any company, the words cited above in 
relation to "any agreement" do not make sense.' 






See : Section 103(2) - Is a change in shareholding required? (1987) The 
Taxpayer 226. 
The section was introduced by s 20 of Act 55 of 1946. 
Glen Anil Development Corp. v SIR 1975 (4) SA 715 at 728 (AD). 
ibid at 729 (AD). 
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it seems clear that in the case of an agreement it can only be a 
company having an assessed loss, which is affected by or concerned with 
the agreement, and which receives any income resulting therefrom, that the 
Legislature could have had in mind. If, therefore the words "any 
agreement" in the opening words of that section were construed as if the 
words "affecting any company" were insened after the words "any 
agreement", as I think they should be, the opening words of the section 
would make sense and would give effect to what in my view the Legislature 
intended.' 
The proposed interpretation of Botha has been enacted ins 103(2) bys 14 of Act 
No.101 of 1978. 
(ii) agreement affecting any company 
(1) agreement 
In the case of CIR v Ocean Manufacturing Ltd the term "agreement" turned out 
to be the pivot of the defence against the Commissioner's attack. 
The facts were as follows. A company had been the subject of a reverse take-
over agreement in order to obtain a 'back-door listing' on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange. The parties involved entered into a take-over agreement and a 
transfer agreement. The taxpayer argued that only the merger-agreement was 
relevant. As far as the merger-agreement was concerned it was possible for the 
taxpayer to prove that the assessed loss was not the sole or main purpose for 
entering into the above agreement. The council for the taxpayer (Model Homes) 
argued that 'in legal form' Model Homes was not a party to the merger-
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agreement, but only to the transfer-agreement. Effectively, however, from an 
economic and business point of view there was only one transaction. 
Nicholas AJA, disturbed by councel's argument, delivered the judgement of the 
Appellate Division: 170 
'I am at a loss to understand all this. The word agreement as used in s 
103(2) connotes a contract, that is, an agreement which is legally binding 
and enforceable between the parties. Any implication that an agreement 'in 
legal form' is something less than or different from such an agreement, . is 
to be rejected. ' 
(2) agreement affecting any company 
The alternative argument advanced by councel was that the expression 'any 
agreement affecting any company' is restricted to an arrangement which affects 
the control of the company or one which affects any person's right to participate 
in the profits or dividends of the company. Nicholas was not impressed by this 
argument and based his opposing judgement on two old quotes of Innes CJ: 171 
'In my opinion there is nothing to warrant that interpretation. Any is "a 
word of wide and unqualified generality. It may be restricted by the 
subject-matter or the context, but prima facie it is unlimited. " (per Innes in 
R v Hugo172) 'In its natural and ordinary sense, any - unless restricted by 
the context - is an indefinite term which includes all of the things to which 





CIR v Ocean Manufacturing Ltd 1990 (3) SA 610 at 618 (AD). 
ibid. 
1926 AD 268 at 271. 
1914 AD 363 at 371. 
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It is submitted that the first requirement is of a very wide ambit in order to bring 
almost all transactions of a company with an assessed loss into the focus of s 
103(2). 
b) Second requirement 
Insofar as the second requirement is concerned there has to be some income 
received by or accrued to that company as a direct or indirect result of the 
agreement or the change in shareholding. The receipt or accrual of income is 
again a matter of fact. 174 
(i) diverted and own income 
In ITC 1123 a company which had previously been engaged in manufacture 
became unable to pay its debts and went into liquidation. 175 The liquidators 
disposed of all the movable assets and only the immovable property remained. 
An entrepreneur acquired the company (the remaining piece of property) with its 
assessed loss and revived the business. The new income produced fell into two 
categories. a) Income received from connected companies and; b) Income 
produced.by transactions with outside parties. 
The appellant submitted that the set-off of the income from connected companies 
was correctly disallowed, as this income was diverted to the company . by the 
entrepreneur from other companies controlled by him in order to avoid tax. 
However, where the company had earned income as a result of better 
174 
175 
De Koker & Urquhart, supra, Vol I, para 26-23. 
ITC 1123 (1968) 31 SATC 48. 
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management or business efficiency introduced by the new majority-shareholder 
the set-off must be allowed. 176 Trollip J. disagreed: 
'That the section was intended to apply where income was diverted from 
another person to a company in order to avoid liability for tax on the part 
of that person is clear from its very language. But its wording is wide and 
there is no warrant for limiting its application to such cases. It refers in the 
first place to 'income ... received by or ... accrued to that company during 
any year of assessment .. '. That is wide enough to include income produced 
by its own activities in contradistinction to income diverted to it. Secondly 
the section speaks of avoiding liability for tax· 'on the part of that 
company' in addition to and in contradistinction to avoiding liability for 
tax 'on the part of ... any other person'; that shows that not only diverted 
income but income produced by the company's own activities can fall 
' within the ambit of the section if its other requirements are fulfilled. ' 
(ii) fatal interruption 
In New Urban Properties v SIR a company which was involved in land-dealing 
went completely insolvent and had an accumulated assessed loss of a few 
hundred thousand Rand. 177 The shares of the company were taken over by 
individuals who were also involved into land-dealing. They intended to use the 
assessed loss in order to set off income channelled through the company with the 
assessed loss. It was admitted on behalf of the taxpayer that tax avoidance was 
the main purpose. Nevertheless, it was contended by the taxpayer that even 
176 
177 
ITC 1123 (1968) 31 SATC 48 at 51; see also ITC 1388 (1983) 46 SATC 126 at 
131. 
New Urban Properties v SIR 1966 (1) 217 (AD). 
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though the assessed loss was not available in this particular year for set off 
against the channelled income it would be available for set off against future 
income. 178 The Appellate Division disagreed. Where s '103(2) applies the 
' tainted' income resulting from the transaction in question will not be allowed to 
be set off against the assessed loss. 179 Furthermore, if the assessed loss cannot be 
set off and balanced in any particular year, there is then no "balance of assessed 
loss which has been carried forward from the preceding year of assessment"; in 
other words, the essential continuity is fatally interrupted. 180 The fatal 
interruption is similar to a company which did not carry on ~jle_in,a particular 
year. 181 It follows that if the company doesn't earn anyr;:tainred~come its 
~ssed loss is irretrievably lost. . C) 
To overcome this problem from a tax planning ~int of view it is suggested by 
Broomberg that the target company is left in Jssession of some pre-existing 
\ 
assets which are capable of generating 'untainted' income,182 This income can 
then be regarded as an 'insurance policy' in order~ escape the consequences of 
a successful attack of the Commissioner under s 103(2) and consequently keeps 
the assessed loss alive. It is possible therefore for a company to be issued with 
two assessments; one reflecting the income which is not set off in cause of the 







ibid at 223. 
ibid at 224. 
ibid at 224. 
S.A. Baz.aars (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1952 (4) SA 505 at 510-511 (AD); see also Sub-
Nigel Ltd v CIR 1948 (4) SA 580 at 589-590; were a company carried on trade 
but didn't earn income. 
Broomberg, supra, at 219. 
De Koker, Urquhart, supra, Vol I, para 26-24. 
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c) Third requirement 
The point at issue is whether the agreement had been entered into solely or 
mainly for the purpose of utilizing any assessed loss in order to avoid liability 
for the payment of tax. The Legislature aimed s 103(2) at an agreement or a 
change in shareholding which has as its sole or main purpose the avoidance of 
tax. This criterion is accordingly the hurdle which will decide the majority of 
cases in regard to s 103(2). 
(i) presumption 
The purpose element must be read together with sub-section ( 4) of s 103. The 
sub-section presumes that the sole or main purpose of utilising an assessed loss is 
to avoid tax. For ease of references 103(4)(b) is set out below: 
(4) Any decision of the Commissioner under subsection (1), (2) or (3) shall be subject to 
objection and appeal, and whenever in proceedings relating thereto it is proved that the · 
transaction, operation, scheme agreement or change in shareholding or members' interests 
in question would result in the avoidance or the postponement of liability for payment of 
any tax, duty or levy imposed by this Act or any previom Income Tax Act or any other law 
administered by the Commissioner, or in the reduction of the amount thereof, it sball be 
presumed, until the contrary is proved -
(a) •••• 
(b) in the case of any such agreement or change in shareholding or members' 
interests, that it has been entered into or effected solely or mainly for the purpose of 
utilizing the ~ loss or balance of ~ loss in question in order to avoid or 
postpone such liability or to reduce the amount thereof. 
Once it is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the arrangement or 
change in shareholding would result in tax avoidance it is up to the taxpayer to 
discharge the onus which is placed upon him in terms of s 103(4)(b). The 
problem of the onus will be discussed at a later stage. 
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(ii) purpose 
For analysing the purpose - element one has to look at the intention of the 
taxpayer at the time of entering into the agreement. 184 Thus the test to apply is a 
subjective one. Where the dominant motive is one other than the avoidance of 
tax, the section will not apply .135 
(1) to avoid liability for tax 
As the meaning of the words is identical to the wording in s 103(1) may I refer 
to the above made observations. A typical example of a case where the sole or 
main purpose was the avoidance of tax is the one of New Urban Properties v 
SIR. 186 Because the company was dormant and as a result of its enormous deficit 
and complete lack of funds it was impossible to imagine how the company could 
have traded at present or in the future. 187 
(2) sound business purpose 
Where sound business decisions govern the agreement or the change in 
shareholding s 103(2) can't be invoked as the main reason would then be a 
commercial one and not the avoidance of tax)88 For that reason s 103(2) can't 
be invoked, where the main reason is to obtain company's assets, goodwill, 
trade-marks, permits and the like. 189 Finally it should be noted that only when 








ITC 1388 Vol 46 (1984) 126 at 132. 
ITC 1388 Vol 46 (1984) 126 at 133. 
1966 (1) SA 217 (AD). 
New Urban Properties v SIR 1966 (1) SA 217 at 222 (AD). 
See i.e.: ITC 983 (1961) 24 SATC 705; ITC 989 (1961) 25 SATC 122; ITC 
1347 (1981) 44 SATC 33. 
Meyerowitz and Spiro, supra, para i621. 
De Koker and Urquhart, supra, Vol I, para 26-23. 
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(ill) differences to s 103 (1) 
The obvious difference between the two sections lies in the absence of the 
normality-requirement ins 103(2). A further point of distinction is the fact that s 
103(2) does not refer to the postponement of a liability. The word "postpone" in 
r~lation to s 103(2) appears only in section 103(4). 191 
(iv) _can s 103(1) be invoked instead of s 103(2) 
A question which hasn't received much attention yet is whether a transaction 
must be attacked under s 103(2) or if the Commissioner can apply s 103(1)? In 
other words can s. 103(1) be invoked to prevent the set-off of an assessed loss. 
South African Courts have not yet been asked to decide this question. Silke is of 
the opinion that the Commissioner could also make use of the general anti-
avoidance provision in order to set aside an assessed loss. 192 It is submitted that 
this is correct, especially as the wording 'sole and main purpose' has been 
changed in both sub-sections into 'solely or mainly'. 
191 
192 
• Assessed Losses and Section 103(2)', (1987) 26 Income Tax Reporter 119 at 
121. 
Silke, Tax Avoidance and Assessed Losses, (1977) 16 Income Tax Reporter 94 
at 95-96; Silke, supra, para 19-37 and 19-38. 
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6 S. 103 (5) The swopping of dividends and interests 
This sub-section is different to s 103(1) and (2) as it is a special anti-avoidance 
provision and not a general one. It is focused at the cession of interest income in 
exchange for receiving dividend income. The subsection reads as follows: 
(5)(a) Where under any transaction, operation or scheme any 
taxpayer has ceded his right to receive any amount of interest in exchange 
for any amount of dividends, and in consequence of such c~ion the 
taxpayer's liablilty for normal tax, as determined before applying the 
provisions of this subsection, has been reduced or extinguished, the 
Commissioner shall determine the liability for normal tax of the taxpayer 
and any other party to the transaction, operation or scheme as if such 
c~ion had not been effected. 
(b) Paragraph (a) shall be deemed to have come into operation on 22 
December 1988 and shall apply -
(i) to any transaction, operation or scheme concluded on or 
after that date; and 
- (ii) to any transaction, operation or scheme concluded before 
that date, if the taxpayer is at liberty to terminate the operation of such 
transaction, operation or scheme without incurring liability for damages, 
compensation or similar relief. 
The special anti-avoidance provision is deemed to have come into operation on 
22 December 1988. 193 Thus all relevant transactions on or after this date will 
fall foul of this sub-section. 194 Furthermore, will this section apply in respect of 
accruals before this date where the taxpayer can terminate the scheme without 
incurring any liability .195 Three conditions have to be met in order for s 103(5) 





Section 103 (S)(b). 
Section 103 (S)(b)(i). 
Section 103 (S)(b)(ii). 
The conditions have beeri summariz.ed by De Koker and Urquhart, Vol I 
para 26-24. 
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(a) the taxpayer has ceded his rights to receive any amount of interest 
in exchange for any amount of dividends 
(b) the cession has taken place under any transaction, operation or 
scheme; and 
( c) in consequence of the cession the liability of the taxpayer for 
normal tax, determined before applying this section, has been 
reduced or extinguished. 
This special anti-avoidance provision has been enacted to attack a certain form of 
tax avoidance where the parties involved in the scheme were companies and 
insurers. The scheme only functioned as a result of peculiar features with regard 
to the participants of the scheme. On the side of the company it is the fact that it 
is not liable for dividend income but for interest income. The peculiar feature of 
the insurer is that his investment income is immaterial for tax purposes and that 
its rate of tax is lower than that of companies. By the dividend-interest swop the 
company was able to reduce its tax liability for taxable interest-income. The 
insurer shared a certain portion of the tax saved as 'bonus I for his trouble. 197 As 
the section came retrospectively into effect it immediately put an stop to the 
divident-interest swops. 
197 (1989) 38 The Taxpayer 1 at 2; 'Voiding Tax Avoidance: 
Another Press Release'. 
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7 Onus of proof 
A question of immense practical importance is that of onus with respect to the 
avoidance of tax. Although s 103( 4) includes a presumption as to the purpose-
element and s 103(3) includes a presumption concerning an arm's length 
transaction with foreigners, the question of the burden of proof is not expressly 
dealt with in the section. 
a) Onus on the Commissioner? 
Certain academic writers have expressed the opinion that the onus of proof lies 
on the Commissioner. 198 The argument advanced is that it would have been 
entirely redundant to make any provision in s 103 where the onus of proof 
already lies on the taxpayer in terms of the general provision of s 82 of the 
Act. 199 The Appellate Division hasn't yet dealt with the problem expressly. 
b) Onus on the taxpayer 
I respectfully disagree with the above mentioned authors. Where the Legislature 
intended to shift the general onus (s 82) from the taxpayer to the Commissioner 
it has to do so in clear language. The mere fact that s 103(4) includes a 
presumption in favour of the Commissioner does not change the onus. It simple 
creates an additional onus for the taxpayer. 200 A shifting of the onus would also 




Meyerowitz and Spiro, supra, para 1623; De Koker & Urquhart,supra, Vol I, 
para 26-25. 
Meyerowitz and Spiro, supra, para 1623 Fn 44. 
De Koker & Urquhart, supra, Vol !,para 26-25. 
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are entered into to the detriment of the fiscus. The wording of the section chosen 
doesn't speak of onus but of a state of mind (satisfaction) of the Commissioner. 
To find this satisfaction the Commissioner ascertains the liability for tax with 
and without the scheme. 201 In his calculations he takes into account the tax affect 
on third parties involved into the scheme as well. Where he finds that less tax is 
payable in consequence of the implementation of the scheme his ' initial' hurdle 
of investigation is overcome. 
c) Discharge of onus 
In order to decide whether or not the taxpayer has discharged the onus of proof 
his intention and ipse dixit must be looked at. While objectively reviewing the 
relevant facts the court has to take the circumstances into consideration. 202 
Whether the onus has been discharged or not has to be established on the balance 
of probability. 203 Where the court has no reason to disbelieve the evidence 
brought forward by the taxpayer and his evidence is not contradicted by 
objective facts, then the taxpayer has discharged the onus borne by him. 204 In 
ITC 1178 this was said in the matter of the onus:205 
'In assessing this evidence and determining whether the onus cast 
upon appellant in regard to this issue has been discharged or not, the 






Broomberg, supra, at 215. 
ITC 1185 35 SATC (1973) 122 at 123. 
Reliance Land & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR 14 SATC 47. 
CIR v Middelman 1991 (1) SA 200 at 203-204. 
ITC 1178 at 35-36. 
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the witnesses for the fonnation and carrying out of the scheme - and 
for doing this at the time when they did - are logically watertight as 
whether they were, as a matter of probability, the main purposes 
which the appellant - or, more precisely, its directors - in fact had in 
mind when the scheme was formulated and carried out . .,,. Naturally the 
logical cogency of the alleged purposes play an important role in 
determining what the true purposes were - since the less cogent they 
are the less acceptable becomes the assertion that they were the true 
· motivating causes - but this cannot be allowed to obscure the real 
inquiry, which is as to the actual state of mind of appellant's 
directors at that time. Another point of importance in this connection 
is that these purposes must be considered in their cumulative effect. ' 
Taxpayers have been quite successful in the past in contests with the 
Commissioner based on s 103(2). Where the taxpayer could show that there was 
a sound commercial reason for the acquisition of a company with an assessed 
loss he will resist the Commissioner's attack. Such good reasons are to obtain 
the company's assets, trade-marks, permits and the like.206 The position of the 
taxpayer is a more difficult one, where the target company is not in the line of 
the his business. 
It is submitted that it is much easier for the Commissioner to succeed, as the 
Court only needs to reach a conclusion that is reasonable in the circumstances, 
while the taxpayer has to go further to a point of satisfying the Court on a 
balance of probabilities and credibility. 207 
206 
207 
Meyerowitz and Spiro, supra, para 1621. 




Once the Commissioner is satisfied that all requirements of s 103 are met various 
options are given to him. He can treat the scheme in such a manner as in the 
circumstances of the case he deems appropriate. He can even ignore the 
transaction completely and ascertain the tax as if the transaction hasn't been 
entered into. 208 Nevertheless, the transaction remains valid and enforcable 
between the parties to it. 209 The Commissioner is precluded from arguing the 
applicability of s 103 where he hasn't formed an opinion on the various 
' matters. 210 The taxpayer should therefore be adviced in the assessment notice or 
another appropriate manner that the Commissioner has applied a certain 
section. 211 It must be kept in mind that all requirements must be fulfilled before 
the transaction may be wholly or partly ignored. In cause of a change in wording 
the Commissioner 'must' invoke s 103 were all requirements are met. While s 
90 of the Act of 1941 gave the Commissioner a discretionary power with the 
word 'may' speaks s 103 now of 'shall' .212 An important limitation of the 
Commissioner's powers is found in ITC 963.213 The ratio of this case is that the 
Commissioner cannot apply the provisions of s 103 so as to collect more tax than 
would have been assessable if there had been no transaction. If the 
Commissioner attempts to increase tax by applying s 103 he will consequently 
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nots 103. 
The wording of s 90 was changed bys 17 of Act No. 78 of 1959; even under 
the discretionary power of s 90 was 'may' interpreted as a 'must'. See CIR v 
King 1947 (2) SA 196 at 209-210. 
ITC 963 (1961) 24 SATC 705. 
Broomberg at 218. 
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All the taxpayer has to loose under a successful attack of the Commissioner 
under s 103 is, at worst, that he has to pay the tax that would have been due in 
any way. 215 Besides that he has to cover the costs of the unsuccessful 
implementation of the scheme. 
The ballgame is a different one where the Commissioner has successfully 
launched an attack under s 103(2). All income resulting from the attacked 
transaction will be treated as ' tainted' income and not be allowed for set off 
against the asssessed loss. Furthermore, the assessed loss is irretrievably lost 
when the company hasn't earned any other 'untainted' income. This are the 
consequences as a result out of the twin-ruling of the Appellate Division in SA 
Bazaars and New Urban Properties.216 
The impact of this rulings is by-passed where the company has some 'untainted' 
source of income. Broomberg's tax planning advice is therefore the following: 217 
'It follows, that when a planner is negotiating a contract that 
involves a change in shareholding in a company with an assessed-loss 
company, it is essential that the target company be left in possession 
of some pre-existing assets which are capable of generating 
'untainted' income. This is an insurance policy.' 
The consequence of the existence of untainted income is that although the set off 
of tainted income will be disallowed, the set off of untainted income has to be 
allowed and the assessed loss will be conserved for future set offs. The affect of 




Report of the Margo Commission at para 27.28(b). Phillip Haupt, 'The 
Commissioner's remedy', (1987) 2 Tax Planning 93 at 93. 
SA Bazaars v CIR, 1952 (4) SA 505 (AD); New Urban Properties v SIR, 1966 
(1) SA 217 (AD). 
Broomberg, tax Strategy at 219. 
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As a result of the recommendations of the Margo - Commission certain changes 
have been implemented in the V.A.T.- Act. 218 The Commissioner is now 
entitled, for example, by s 62 of the V.A.T.-Act to publish by notice in the 
Gazette a list of names of persons who have been convicted of tax evasion. The 
amount of the fine has been increased to R 10.000. 
It appears to me that tax evasion is still treated as 'gentlement' s crime'. The 
Legislature seems to have lost the sight for proportions and reality. Insider 
dealing, for example, can now be punished with a fine of up to R 500.000. It is 
questionable if a total amount of money serves the purpose at all, or if rather a 
triple amount of the avoided tax would be more threatening. As this is a political 
and not a legal question its answer has to be found in Parliament. 
Finally it is noted that every decision of the Commissioner is subject to objection 
and appeal. 219 
218 
219 
Report of the Margo Commission at para 27 .34. 
Section 103( 4). 
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9. Conclusion 
A distinction must not only be drawn between tax evasion and tax avoidance but also 
between tax avoidance and tax mitigation. Only in cases of tax mitigation is the 
taxpayer enjoying the freedom of choice to enter into proper transactions to minimize 
his burden of tax. The interpretation of s 103 follows general rules of interpretation. 
However, the applicability of the contra fiscum . rule should be limited following the 
English Jurisdiction in order to provide a remedy against the mischief the section was 
enacted for by Parliament. 
The first element of s 103(1) has to be understood very widely in order to give the anti 
avoidance provision a broad application. The wording of sub-section (1) makes it clear 
that the effect and the purpose of a transaction must be distinguished contrary to foreign 
anti avoidance provisions. This distinction has caused certain problems in the past but 
they were overcome by reason of amendments made to the section. 
The crux of s 103(1) is the normality requirement. The arm's length test, also easily to 
establish, is not the standard test as it only covers certain situations. 
Insurmountable difficulties within the normality requirement are created · by the 
' circumstances' and the term ' transaction of the nature of the transaction in question'. 
A new approach is found ins 73 of the V.A.T.-Act. The same section also provides a 
new test of normality - the bona fide business purpose test. The utilization of assessed 
losses for purposes of tax avoidance is covered bys 103(2). Although the first element 
is set out in the alternative it is the change in shareholding which is more common. The 
income received can be diverted or own income. Where sound business purposes 
dominate an arrangement the attack of the Commissioner will be resisted successfully. 
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The onus of proof lies on the taxpayer and not on the Commissioner. The consequences 
of a successful attack under s 103(1) are not so dramatic for the taxpayer as only the 
tax due has to be paid. Where on the other hand section 103(2) can be invoked 
successfully by the Commissioner the assessed loss might be at stake. When the 
taxpayer doesn't have an 'insurance policy' in form of 'untainted' income his assessed 
loss will be irretrivably lost. The South African anti avoidance provision s 103 is in its 
application alike an old, but experienced tiger. When it comes to the consequences of 
the encounter it is more a paper tiger. 
t 
Appendix I Amendments & s 73 V.A. T. - Act 
s 90 of Act No. 31 of 1941 
s 20 of Amendment Act No. 55 of 1946 
s 17 of Amendment Act No. 78 of 1959 
s 103 of Act No. 58 of 1962 
s 14 of Amendment Act No. 101 of 1978 
s 37 of Amendment Act No. 121 of 1984 
s 19 of Amendment Act No. 70 of 1989 




to avoirl liubilit.y 
for or rocluco 
nmount of tax. 
~O. Whenever U1c Commissioner is satisfied that any trnn~• 
actwn or operation has been entered into or carried out for 
the purpose of avoiding liability for the payment of any tUI 
impo~ed ?Y t~is Act, or reducing the amount of any such tu1:, 
any hab1hty tor any such tax, and the amount thereof may he 
dete~mined, and the pay~ent of the tax chargeable' may be 
required and enforced, as 1f the transaction or operation had 
n_o~ been entered in_to. or carried out: Provided that any de-
c1s10~ of_ the Comm1ss1oner ~oder this section shall be subject 
to obJect10~ a~d appeal; and In any proceedings relating thereto, 
whenever 1t 1s proved that the transaction or operation in 
question would result in the avoidance of liability for the pay-
ment of any such tax, or in the reduction of the amount thereof, 
it shall be presumed, unless the contrary ia proved, that the 
transaction or operation was entered into or carried out for • 
the purpose of avoiding snch liability or of reducing auch · 
amount. · 
90. Wanneer die Komm1&sar1s oortu1g is dat een of ander 
transaksie of handeling aangegaan of uitgevoer is met die 
oogwerk (?ID aanspreeklikheid vir die betnling van 'n deur 
hierdie Wet opgelegde belasting te ontduik, of om die bedrag 
van 'n sodanige belasting te verminder, kan belastingpligtig-
heid aan so 'n belasting, en die bedrag daarvan, vasgestel word, 
en die betaling van die hefbare helasting kan ve_reis en afge-
dwing word, asof die transaksie of handeling nie aangegaan of 
uitgevoer ·waa nie : Met di_en verstande dat 'n beslissing van 
die Kommisaaria ingevolge , hierdie artikel aan beawaar en 
appll onderhewig ia, en· dat dit in enige verrigting~ ':!!et betrek-
king daartoe, wanneer dit bewya word dat die b"!t.rokke trana-
aksie of handeling die ontduiking v;;. ........ opu,ukJ1icheid VIr die 
betaling van sodanige ueu,oLing of die vermindering van die 
bedrag daarvan tot gevolg sou he, vermoed word, tensy die 
teendeel bewya word, dat die transakaie of handeling aange-
gaan of uitgevoer ia met die oogmerk om sodauige _aanspreek-





hoid aan helaRting 




Act No. 55 
of 1946. 
Bub!titution of 
eection 90 of 
Act 31 of 1941. 
20. (1) The following section is hereby substituted for~ 












90. (1) Whenever the Commissioner is sa~ 
fied- ,,, 
...... , 
(a) that · any transaction, operation or schemi 
(whether entered into or carried out before or=, 
after the commencement of this Act) has bee&~ 
entered into or carried out for the purpose o(i 
avoiding liability for the payment of any tu." 
duty or levy on income (including any a~ 
tax, duty or levy imposed by a previoll! ~ 
or reducing the amount thereof, and baa * 
effect of avoidiog liab;Jity fo, the p,ym,n~ 
any tax, duty or levy on income or of redu · . 
the amount thereof, the liability for any 
duty or levy on income and the amount the 
may be determined as if the· tra • · 
operation or scheme had not been entered · ·_ 
or carried out ; · ·:t 
(b) that any agreement or any change in the 
holding in any company, as a direct or in • 
result of which income haa been received 
has accrued or has under section tl&i -.- · 
been apportioned to any company durinf 
year of assessment, has at any time befi 
after the commencement of the Inco ... 
.A.ct, 1946, been entered into or effected bT 
person solely or mainly for the p 
utilizing any balance of assessed 10?9 •• 
by the company, in order to avoid. -· 
on the part of any person for the pa , . 
any tax, duty or levy on income; or to_-
the amount thereof, the set-off of.~ 
· ' · balance ·against any such incoi:ne·ma _ 
- allowed.· 
(2) Any decision of the Commissioner undra 
secti?n (1) aha!~ be subje?t to objection and·--- _ 
and in proceedings relatmg thereto, whenever it:Jli 
proved that the transaction, operation,· eo_ "' 
agreement or change in shareholding in qu · 
would result in the avoidance of liability for pa'~ 
ment of any tax, duty or levy on income or in. · 
reduction of the·· amount thereof, it shall-:: 
presumed, until the contrary is proved-· · 
(a) in the case of any such transaction, ope 
or scheme, that it was entered into or MJ!ftl,n 
out for the purpose of avoiding such li _ 
or of reducing the amount thereof; and :;;· · '· 
s-,c,; 
·l!i< 
(b) in the case of any such agreement or chanp_: .. · 
shareholding, that it has been entered in~;_ae 
effected solely or mainly for the pur~a 
utilizing the balance of assessed loss 111 qu 
in order to avoid such liability or to reduce 
amo_unt thereof.". 
Wet No. 55 
van 1946. 
20. (1) Artikel negentig van - die 
cieur die volgende artikel vervang: 
Hoofwet wora' hiermee Vervanging van 
artikel 90 van 
,.Tr_a.ns- 90. (1) Wanneer die Kommissaris oortu.ig is-
>lkstes,. (a) dat een of antler transaksie, handeling of 
handehngs k ( kill. f d. · f d. of skemas s ema onve~s 1g o . 1~ voor o na 1e 
met oogmerk inwerk:ingtreding van h:ierdie Wet aangegaan, 
om b~Ias~ing- verrig of uitgevoer is) aangegaan, verrig of 
phgtigheid uitgevoer is met die oogmerk om aanspreekl:ik-
ten ops1gte h .d . d. b 1· , b I . f h ffi ,an belasting e1 vu 1e eta !Ilg van n e astlilg o e ng 
op inkomste op inkomste (met inbegrip van so 'n belasting 
te ontdu.ik of heffing deur 'n vorige Wet opgele) te vermy 
of b~ag. of om die bedrag daarvan te verminder, en die 
;~~e~~~~r~ uitwerk:ing het dat dit aanspreekl:ikheid vir 
die betaling van 'n belasting of heffing op 
inkomste vermy of die bedrag daarvan ver-
minder, dan word die belastingpligtigheid ten 
opsigte van enige belasting of p.effing op 
inkomste, asook die bedrag daarvan vasgestel 
asof die transaksie, handeling of skema nie 
aangegaan, verrig of uitgevoer is nie ; 
(b) dat een of antler ooreenkoms of een of antler 
verandering in die hou van aandele in 'n 
maatskappy, as 'n di.rekte of indirekte gevolg 
waarvan inkomste gedurende 'n jaar van 
aanslag ontvang is deur of toegeval het of 
kragtens artikel sewen-en-dertig toegedeel is 
aan 'n maatskappy, te eniger tyd voor of na 
die inwerk:ingtreding van die Inkom.stebelas-
tingwet, 1946, deur enige persoon aangegaan 
of teweeggebring is, u.itsluitlik of hoofsaakl:ik 
met die oogmerk om 'n balans van vasgestelde 
verlies wat die maatskappy gely het, aan te 
wend ten einde aanspreeklikheid aan die kant 
van enige persoon vi.r die betaling van 'n 
· belasting of heffing op inkom.ste te vermy of 
.. die bedrag daarvan te verminder; dan kan die 
in vergelyk:i.ng bring van so 'n balans met 
· sulke inkomste van die hand· gewys word. 
(2) 'n Beslissing van die Kommissaria ingevolge 
aub-artikel (1) is aan beswaar en appel onderhewig, 
en wanneer in enige verrigtinga wat daarop 
betrekk:i~g het, bewys word d?,t die onderhawige 
transaks1e, handeling, skema, ooreenkoms of veran-
dering in die hou van aandele, die vermyding van 
aanspreeklikheid vir betaling van enige belasting 
ef heffing op inkomste of die vermindering van die 
bedrag daarvan ten gevolg sou he, word vermoed, 
totdat die teendeel bewys word-:-
(a) jn die geval van so 'n transaksie, handeling of 
skema, dat dit aangegaan, verrig of uitgevoer 
· is met die oogmerk om bedoelde aanspreekl:ik-
heid te vermy of die bedrag daarvan te ver-
minder; en 
(b) in die geval van so 'n ooreenkoms of verandering 
in die hou van aandele, dat dit aangegaan of 
teweeggebring is uitsluitlik of hoofsaaklik met 
die oogmerk om die onderhawige be.Jans. van 
vasgestelde verlies aan te wend ten einde 
bedoelde aanspreeklikheid te vermy of die 
bedrag daarvan te verminder.". 
. . 
Wet 31 van 1941. 
Act No. 78 
of 1959. 
Substitution of 
section 90 of 
Act 31 of 1941, 
as substituted by 
section 20 of 
Act 55 of 1946. 
17. The following section is hereby substituted for section 
ninety of the principal .A.ct: 
"Trans- 90. (1) (a) Where lny transaction, operatio11 or 
actions, scheme (wh~ther entered into or carried out 
operations or before or after the commencement of tl11·s schemes for 
purposes of Act, and including a transaction, oper:ition 
avoiding or 'Or scheme involving the alienation of property) 
postponing has been entered into or carried out, which 




amounts of liability for any tax, duty or levy on income 
taxes on (including any such tax, duty or levy imposed 
income. by a previous Act), or of reducing the amount 
thereof, and which in the opinion of the Com-
missioner, having regard to the circumstances 
under·· which the transaction, operation or 
.scheme was entered into or carried out-.,, 
(i) was entered into or carried out by means 
or.in a manner which would not normally 
be employed in the entering into or 
carrying out of a transaction, operation 
or scheme of the nature of the transac-
tion, operation or scheme in question; or 
(ii) has created rights or obligations which 
would not normally be. created between 
persons dealing at arm's length under a 
transaction, operation or scheme of the 
nature of the transaction, operation or 
scheme in question, 
. and the Commissioner is of opinion that the 
avoidance or the postponement of such liabi-
lity, or the reduction of the amount of such 
· liability, was. the sole or one of the main 
purposes of the transaction, operation or 
scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the 
liability for any tax, duty or levy on in-
come and the amount thereof as if the trans-
. action, operation or scheme had not been 
entered into or carried out or in such manner 
as in the circumstances of the case he deems 
appropriate for the prevention or diminution 
of such avoidance, postponement or reduc-
tion. 
(b) Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that 
any agreement or any change in the share-
holding in any company, as a direct or in-
direct resnlt of which income has been re-
ceived by or has accrued to that company 
during ar.y year of assessment, has at any 
time before or after the commencement of 
the Income Tax Act, 1946, been entered into 
or effected by any person solely or mainly for 
the purpose of utilizing any assessed loss or 
any balance of assessed loss incurred by the 
company, in orper to avoid liability' on the 
part of that company or any other person 
for the payment of any tax, duty or levy on 
income, or to reduce the amount thereof, the 
set off of any such assessed loss or balance of 
assessed loss against any such income shall 
be disallowed. 
Act No. 78 
of 1959. 
(c) For the purposes of paragraph (a) any trans-
action, operation or scheme (whether entered 
into or carried out before or after the com-
mencement of this Act) whereby any person 
/. (other than a company) who is ordinarily resi-
dent or carrying on business in the Union, or 
any company registered or carrying on busi-
ness in the Union, has disposed of shares held 
by such person or such company in any com-
pany registered or incorporated in the Union 
to any person (other than a company) not 
ordinarily resident nor carrying on business 
in the Union or to any company registered 
outside the Union, shall. unless it is proved 
to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that 
the parties are independent persons dealing at 
arm's length with each other, be deemed to 
be a transaction. operation or scheme entered 
into or carried out by means or in a mann~r 
not normally employed in the entering into or 
carrying out of such a transaction, operation 
· or scheme of the nature of the transaction, 
operation or scheme in question. 
(2) Any decision of the Commissioner under 
sub-section (1) shall be subject to objection and 
appeal, and in proceedings relating thereto, when• 
ever it is proved that the transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement or change in shareholding in 
· question would result in the avoidance or the post-
ponement of liability for payment of any tax, duty 
or levy on income or in the reduction of the 
amount thereof it shall be presumed, until the con-
trary is proved-
' 
(a) in the case of any such transaction, operation 
or scheme, that its sole or one of its main 
purposes was the avoidance or the postpone-
ment of such liability, or the reduction of 
the amount of such liability; and 
(b) in the case 0£ any such agreement or change 
in shareholding, that it has been entered into 
. or effected solely or mainly for the purpose 
of utilizing, the assessed loss or• balance of 
assessed loss in question in order to avoid 
or postpone such liability or to reduce the 
amount thereof.". 
17. Artikel negentig van die Hoofwet word hierby deur 
die volgende artikel vervang: 
,.Trans- 90. (1) (a) Waar 'n traosaksie, handeling of 
aksies, skema (onverskillig of dit voor of na die io-
handclings 
of skemas werkingtreding van hierdie Wet aangegaao, 
met oogmerk verrig of uitgevoer is, en met inbegrip van 'n 
om belas- transaksie, handeling of skema waarby die 
tingpligtig- vervreemding van eiendom betrokke is) aao-
hcict ten 
opsigte van gegaan, verrig of uitgevoer is wat die uit-
belasting werking het dat dit aanspreeklikheid vir die 
op inkomste betaling van 'n belasting of heffing op inkom-
te ontduik ste vermy of uitstel (met inbegrip van so 'n 
of uit te belasting of heffing deur 'n vorige Wet opge-
stcl of - -
bedrag van le) of om die bedrag daarvan te verminder, en 
belasting wat na die oordeel van die Kommissaris, in-
te verminder. agnemende die omstandighede waaronder die 
transaksie, handeling of skema aangegaao, 
vemg of uitgevoer was-
(i) aangegaan, verrig of uitgevoer was deur 
middele of op 'n wyse wat nie normaal-
wcg by die aangaan. verrigting of uit-
vocring van 'n transaksie, handeling of 
skema van die aard van die onderhawige 
traosaksie, handeling of skema aangeweod 
sou word nie; of 
(ii) regte of verpligtings geskep bet wat nie 
nonnaalweg tussen persone wat by 'n 
transaksie. handeling of skema van die 
aard van die onderhawige transaksie, 
handeling of skema. die uiterste voor-
waardes beding. geskep sou word nie. 
en die Kommissaris van oordeel is dat die 
vermyding of die uitstelling of die vermiode-
ring van die bedrag van sodanige belasting-
pligtigheid die enigste of een van die hoof-
oogmerke van die transaksie, handeling of 
skema was. stel die Kommissaris die belasting-
pligtigheid ten opsigte van enige belasting of 
heffing op inkomste asook die bedrag daarvan 
vas asof die transaksie, handeling of skema 
nie aangegaan, verrig of uitgevoer is nie of 
op so 'n wyse as wat hy in die omstandig-
hede van die geval gepas ag vir die voor-
koming of beperking van sodanigc vermyding, 
uitstelling of vermindering. 
(b) Wanneer die Kommissaris oortuig is dat 'n 
ooreenkoms of 'n verandering in die aandele-
besit in 'n maatskappy, as 'n direkte of in• 
direkte gevolg waarvan inkomste gedurende 
'n jaar van aanslag ontvang is deur of toege-
val het aan daardie maatskappy, te eniger 
tyd voor of na die inwerkingtrcding van die 
Inkomstebelastingwet, 1946, deur 'n persoon 
aangegaan of tcweeggebring is uitsluitlik of 
hoofsaaklik met die oogmerk om 'n vasge-
stelde verlies of 'n balans van vasgestelde ver-
lies wat die maatskappy gely het, aan te wend 
ten einde aanspreeklikheid aan die kant van 
daardie maatskappy of 'n ander persoon vir 
die betaling van 'n belasting of heffing op 
inkomste te vermy of die\ bedrag daarvan te 
verminder, dan word die in vergelyking bring 
van so 'n vasgestelde verlies of balans van 
vasgestelde verlies teen bedoelde inkomste van 
die hand gewys. 
Wet No. 78 
van 1959. 
Vcrvanging van 
artikel 90 van 
Wet 31 van 1941, 
soos vervang deur 
artikel 20 van 
Wet 55 van 1946. 
(c) By die toepassing van paragraaf (a) word 'n 
transaksie, handeling of skema (onverskillig 
of dit voor of na die inwerkingtreding van 
hierdie Wet aangegaan, verrig of uitgevoer is) 
waarby 'n persoon (behalwe 'n maatskappy) 
wat gewoonlik in die Unie woonagtig is of 
daarin besigheid dryf, of 'n maatskappy wat 
in die Unie geregistreer is of daarin besig. 
heid dryf, · aandele wat so 'n persoon of so 
'n maatskappy besit in 'n maatskappy wat in 
die Unie geregistreer of ingelyf is, aan 'n 
persoon (behalwe 'n maatskappy) wat nie 
gewoonlik in die Unie woonagtig is of daarin 
besigheid dryf nie of aan 'n maatskappy wat 
buite die Unie geregistreer is, van die hand 
gesit het, geag 'n transaksie, handeling of 
skema te wees wat aangegaan, verrig of uit-
gevoer is deur middele of op 'n wyse wat nie 
normaalweg by die aangaan, verrigting of 
uitvoering van so 'n transaksie, handeling of 
skema van die aard van die onderhawige 
transaksie, handeling of skema aangewend 
word nie, tensy tot bevrediging van die Kom-
missaris bewys word dat die partye onafhank-
like persone is wat met mekaar die uiterste 
voorwaardes beding het. 
(2) 'n Beslissing van die Kommissaris ingevolge 
sub•artikel (1) is aan beswaar en appel onderhewig, 
en wanneer in enige verrigtings wat daarop betrek-
king het, bewys word dat die onderhawige trans-
aksie, handeling, skema, ooreenkoms of ver-
andering in aandelebesit, die vermyding of die 
uitstelling van aanspreeklikheid vir betaling van 
enige belasting of heffing op inkomste of die ver-
mindering van die bedrag daarvan ten gevolg 
sou he, word vermoed, totdat die teendeel bewys 
word-
(a) in die geval van so 'n transaksie, handeling 
of skema, wat die enigste of een van die 
hoofoogmerke daarvan die vermyding of die 
uitstelling van of die vermindering van die 
bedrag van sodanige belastingpligtigheid was; 
en 
(b) in die geval van so 'n ooreenkoms of ver-
andering in aandelebesit, dat dit aangegaan 
of teweeggebring is uitsluitlik of hoofsaaklik 
met die oogmerk om die onderhawige vas-
gestelde verlies of balans van vasgestelde ver-
Iies aan te wend ten einde bedoelde aanspreek-
likheid te vermy of uit, te stel of die bedrag 
daarvan te verminder." J 
Wet No. 78 
van 1959. 
103. (I) ·Where any transaction, operation or scheme 
(whether entered into or carried out before or after the com-
mencement of this Act, and including a transaction, operation 
or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered 
into or carried out which has the effect of avoiding or post-
poning liability for any tax, duty or levy on income (including 
any such tax, duty or levy imposed· by a previous Act), or of 
reducing the amount thereof, and which in the opinion of the 
Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which 
the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or 
carried out-
(i) was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner 
which would not normally be employed in the entering 
into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or 
scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or 
scheme in question; or 
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would not 
nonnally be created between p~rsons dealing at arm's 
length under a transaction, operation or scheme of 
the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in 
question, 
and the Commissioner is of the opinion that the avoidance or 
the postponement of such liability, or the reduction of the 
amount of such liability was the sole or one of the main purposes 
of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner 
shall determine the liability for any tax, duty or levy on income 
and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or 
scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such 
manner as in the circumstances of the case he deems appropriate 
for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postpone-
ment or reduction. 
(2) Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that any agree-
ment or any change in the shareholding in any company, as 
a direct or indirect result of which income has been received 
by or has accrued to that company during any year of assess-
ment, has ·at any time before or after the commencement of the 
Income Tax Act, 1946, been entered into or effected by any 
person solely or mainly for the purpose of utilizing any assessed 
loss or any balance of assessed loss incurred by the company, 
in order to avoid liability on the part of that company or any 
other person for the payment of any tax, duty or levy on income, 
or to reduce the amount thereof, the set-off of any such assessed 
loss or balance of assessed loss against any such income shall be 
disallowed. 
(3) ·For the purposes of sub-section (1) any transaction, 
operation or scheme (whether entered into or carried out 
before or after the commencement of this Act) whereby any 
-person (other than a company) who is ordinarily resident or 
carrying on business in the Republic, or any company registered 
or carrying on business in the Republic, has disposed of shares 
held by such person or such company in any company registered 
or incorporated in the Republic to any person (other than a 
company) not ordinarily resident nor carrying on business in 
the Republic or to any company registered outside the Republic, 
shall, unless it is proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner 
that the parties are independent persons dealing at arm's length 
with each other, be deemed to be a transaction, operation or 
scheme entered into or carried out by means or in a manner not 
normally employed in the entering into or carrying out of such 
a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the trans-
action, operation or scheme in question. 
(4) Any decision of the Commissioner under sub-section (1), 
(2) or (3) shall be subject to objection and appeal, and when-
ever in proceedings relating thereto it is proved that the trans-
action, operation, scheme, agreement or change in. share-
holding in question would result in the avoidance or the post-
ponement of liability for payment of any tax, duty or levy on 
income or in the reduction of the amount thereof, it shall be 
presumed, until the contrary is proved-
(a) in the case of any such transaction, operation or scheme, 
that its sole or one of its main purposes was the 
avoidance or the postponement of such liability or the 
reduction of the amount of such liability; or 
(b) in the case of any such agreement or change in share-
holding, that it has been entered into or · effected 
solely or mainly for the purpose of utilizing the assessed 
loss or balance of assessed loss in question in order 








for or reducing 
amounts of taxes 
on income. 
Act No. 58 
of 1962. 
Act No. 58 
of 1962. 







vermy of uit te stcl 
of bedrag van 
belasting te 
vermindcr. 
Wet No. 58 
van 1962. 
103. (i) Waar 'n transai<sie. handeling of skema (or.geag 
cf d1t voor of na die inwerkingtreding van hierdie Wet aaoge-
gaan, verrig of uitgevoer is. en met inbegrip van 'n transaksie. 
handeling of skema waarby die vervreemding van eiendom 
betrokke is) aangegaan, verrig of uitgevoer is wat die uitwerking 
het om aansprccklikheid vir die betaling van 'n belasting or 
heffing op inkomste tc vcrmy of uit te stel (met inbegrip van so 
'n belasting of heffing dcur 'n vorige Wet opgele) of om die 
bedrag daarvan te verminder, en wat na die oordeel van die 
Komrnissaris, met inagneming van die omstandighede waar-
onder die transaksie, handeliog of skema aangegaan, verrig of 
uitge,·oer was-
- (i) aangegaan, verrig of uitgevoer was deur middele of 
op 'n wyse wat nie normaalweg by die aangaan, ver-
rigting of uitvoering van 'n transaksie, handeling of 
skema van die aard van die onderhawige transaksie, 
handeling of skema aangewend sou word nic; of 
(ii) rcgte of verpligtings gcskep het wat nie normaalweg 
tussen pcrsone wat by ·n transaksie, handeling of 
skerna van die aard van die onderhawige transaksie, 
handeling of skema, die uiterste voorwaardes beding, 
gcskep sou word nie, 
en die Kommissaris van oordecl is dat die vermyding of die 
uitstel of die vermindering van die bedrag van sodanige be-
1.:lstingpligtigheid die cnigste of een van die hoofoogmerke van 
die transaksie, handeling of skema was, stel die Kommissaris 
die belastingpligtigheid ten opsigte van enige belasting of 
hefting op inkomste asook die bedrag daarvan vas asof die 
transaksie, handeling of skcma nie aangegaan, verrig of uitge-
voer is nie of op so 'n wyse as wat hy in die omstandighede van 
die geval gepas ag vir die voorkoming of beperking van sodanige 
vermyding, uitstel of vermindering. 
(2) Wanneer die Kommissaris oortuig is dat 'n ooreenkoms 
of 'n verandering in die aandelcbesit in 'n maatskappy, as 'n 
direkte of indirekte gevolg waarvan inkomstc gedurende 'n 
jaar van aanslag ontvang is deur of toegeval het aan daardie 
maatskappy, te cniger tyd voor of na die inwerkingtreding van 
die Inkomstebelastingwet, 1946, deur 'n persoon aangegaan of 
tcweeggebring is uitsluitlik of hoofsaaklik met die oogmerk 
om 'n vasgestelde verlies of 'n balans van vasgestelde verlies 
wat die maatskappy gely hct, aan te wend ten einde aanspreek-
lik.heid aan die kant van daardie maatskappy of 'n~ander persoon 
vir die betaling van 'n belasting of heffing op inkomste te vermy 
of die bedrag daarvan te verminder, word die in vergelyking 
bring van so 'n vasgestelde verlies of balans van vasgestelde 
verlies teen bedoelde inkomste van die hand gewys. 
(3) By die toepassing van sub-artikel (1) word 'n transaksie, 
handeling of skema (ongeag of dit voor of na die inwerking-
treding van hierdie Wet aangegaan, verrig of uitgevoer is) 
waarby 'n persoon (behalwe 'n maatskappy) wat gewoonlik in 
die Republiek woonagtig is of daarin besigheid dryf, of 'n 
maatskappy wat in die Republiek geregistreer is of daarin qesig-
heid dryf, aandele wat so 'n persoon of so 'n maatskappy besit 
in 'n maatskappy wat in die Republiek geregistreer of ingelyf 
is, aan 'n persoon (behalwe 'n maatskappy) wat nie. gewoonlik 
in die Republiek woonagtig is of daarin besigheid dryf nie of 
aan 'n maatskappy wat buite die Republiek geregi~t(eer is, 
van die hand gesit het, geag 'n transaksie, handeling of skema 
te wees wat aangegaan, verrig of uitgevoer is deur middele of 
op 'n wyse wat nie normaalweg by die aangaan, verrigting of 
uitvoering van so 'n transaksie, handeling of skema van 
die aard van 'die onderhawige transaksie, handeling of skema 
aangewend word nie, tensy tot bevrediging van die Komrnissaris 
bewys word dat die partye onafhanklike persone is wat met me-
kaar die uiterste voorwaardes beding het. 
(4) 'n Beslissing van die Kommissaris iogevolge sub-artikel 
(!), (2) of (3) is aan beswaar en appel onderhewig, en wanneer 
by verrigtings wat daarop betrekk.ing het, bewys word dat die 
onderhawige transaksie, handeling, skema, ooreenkoms of 
verandering in aandelebesit, die vermyding of die uitstel van 
aanspreek.likheid vir betaling van enige belasting of heffing 
op inkomste of die vermindering van die bedrag daarvan ten 
gevolg sou he, word vermoed, totdat die.teendeel bewys word-
(a) in die geval van so 'n transak$ie, handeling of skema, 
dat die enigste oogmerk of een van die hoofoogmerke 
daarvan die vermyding of die uitstel van of die ver-
mindering van die bedrag van sodanige belasting-
pligtigheid was; of 
(b) in die geval van so 'n ooreenkoms of verandering in 
aand"elebesit, dat dit aangegaan of teweeggebring is 
uitsluitlik of hoofsaaklik met die oogm1::rk om die 
onderhawige vasgestelde verlies of balans van vas-
gestelde verlies aan te wend ten einde bedoelde aan-
spreeklikheid te vermy of ui t te stel of· die bed rag 
daarvan te verrninder. / 
Act No. IOI, 1978 
. ,. 
14. (I) Section 103 of the principal Act is hereby amended- Amendment of 
(a) by the substitution for subsections (1) and (2) of the ~ 103 of 
following subsections: Act JO of l962. 
"(I) [Where l Whenever the Secretary is satisfied 
that any transaction, operation or scheme (whether 
e'iiiered into or carried out before or after the commence-
ment of this Act. and including a transaction, operation 
or scheme involving the alienation of _pt'l)perty)-
.i;U, has been entered into or carried out which has the 
effect of avoiding or postponmg liability for _U!£ 
payment of any tax. duty or ICY)' [on income 
· (including any sucb tax, duty or levy impo&ed by 
a previous Act) l imposed by ·this Act or any 
previous Income Tax Act. ar of reducing the 
amount thereof; and [which in the opinion of the 
Secretary' J 
( b) having regard to the circumstances under which the 
- transaction. operation or scheme was entered into 
or carried out-
C 
(i) was entered into or carried out by means or in 
a manner which would not normally be 
employed in the entering into or carrying out 
of a transaction, operation or scheme of the 
nature of the transaction, operation or scheme 
in question; or 
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would 
not normally be created between persons 
dealing at arm· s length under a transaction, 
operation or scheme of the aature of the 
transaction, operation or scheme in question; 
and 
[the Secretary is of the opinion that the avoid-
ance or the postponement of such liability, or 
the reduction of the amount of such liability was 
the sole or one of the main purposes of the 
transaction, operation or scheme,] 
was entered into or carried out sole! or mainly for 
the purposes of the avoidance or the postponemen 
of liability for the payment of any tax. duty or levy 
(whether imposed by this Act or ·any previous 
Income Tax Act or any other law administered by 
the Secretary) or the reduction of the amount o 
such liability, 
the Secretary shall determine the liability for any tax, 
duty or levy [on income] imposed by this Act. and the 
amount thereof, as if the. transaction, .0?,:1'8rioo or 
scheme had not been entered into or carrie,(out, or in 
such manner as in the circumstances. of the case be 
deems appropriate for the prevention or diminution of 
such avoidance, postponement or ~uction. 
(2) Whenever the Secretary .is sattstted that any 
agreement affecting any company or anv charige in the 
shareholding in any company, as a 0ll'CCt or indirect 
result of which income has been received. by or has 
accrued to that company dunng any year of assessment, 
has at any time before or after tile commencement of the 
Income Tax Act, 1946, been entered into or effected by 
any person solely or mainly for the purpose of utilizing 
any assessed loss or any balance of assessed loss . 
incurred by the company, in order to avoid liability on 
the pan of that company or any other person for the 
payment of any tax, duty or _ leyY on income, or to 
reduce the amount thereof, the set-off of any such 
assessed loss or balance of assessed loss against any 
such income shall be disallowed."; and 
(b) by the substitution for subsection (4) of the following 
subsection: 
"(4) Any decision of the Secretary under subsection 
(I), (2) or (3) shall be subject to objection and appeal, 
and whenever in proceedings relating thereto it is proved 
that the transaction. operation, scheme, agreement or 
change in shareholding in question would result.in the 
avoidance or the postponement or J.tability ror payment 
of any tax, duty or levy [on incomeJ i.mposc:a by this 
Act or any previous Income Tax Act or any other law 
administered by the Secretary, or in· the reduction of the 
amount thereof, it shall be presumed. until the a>ntrary 
is proved-
(a) in the case of any such transaction, ooeration or 
scheme, that [its sole or one of' its llUIUI) it was 
entered into or carried out solely or mamty -i'ortiie 
purposes [wasJ of the avoidance or the oostpone--. 
ment · of such liabilitv • or the reduction of the 
amount or.sucn uaouny; or 
(b) in tne case of anv such agreement or change in 
sh~notding, mat u nas been entered into or 
effected solely or mainly for the purpose of 
utilizing the assessed loss or balance of assessed 
loss m •question in order to avoid or postpone such 
liability· or to ·reduce lhe amount 'thereof.''. 
Wet No. 101, 1971.,.- Wysiging van artikel 103 van 
Wet 58 van 1962. 
14. (l) Artikel 103 van die Hoofwet word hierby gewysig-
(a) deur subartikels (1) en (2) deur die volgende subartikels 
te vervang: 
,.\I) EWaarJ Wanneer die Sek:retans oortuig is dat 
'n transaksie, ha.ndeling of skema (ongeag of dit voor of 
na die inwerkingtrcding van hierdie Y{et aangegaan, 
verrig of uitgevoer is; F.11 met inbcgrip vin 'a transaksie, 
handeling of skema,.,"waarby''.]lie vervreemding van 
eiendom bettokke is~ 
(a) aangegaan,.: veriia o[~evoer:is· ·wai die uitwer-
- king bet om aanspreek:lilcheid .. w die betaling van 
'n belasting of hefting opgete "dem bierdie Wet of 
'n vorige In.komstebelastingwet (op ia.komsteJ te 
vermy of uit te ste.l J(met ~ van so 'n 
be1asting of befliq deur 'o vorip Wet opgele)J 
of om die bedrag daarvan te: v~ en Ewat na 
die oonleel vaa die Sekretaril,J 
!!!2, met inagncmm1t vu cJJe..omstandigbede waaronder 
die tranAAksie; . bandeling o£, skana aangegaan, 
verrig of uitgevoer was-
(i) aangegaan, verrig of· uitgevoer was deur 
middele of op 'n wyse wat nie.normaalweg by 
die aangaan, verrigting of uitvoering van · n 
transaksie, handeling of skema van die aard 
van die onderhawige transaksie, handeling of 
skema aangewend sou word nie; of 
(ii) regte of verpligtings geskep het wat nie 
normaalweg tussen persone Wat by 'n transak-
sie, handeling of skema van· die aard van die 
onderhawige transaksie, bandeling of skema, 
die uiterste voorwaardes beding, geskep sou 
word nie, en· 
Edie Sekretaris van oordeel n dat die vermyding 
of die uitstel of die vermindering van die bed.rag 
van sodanige bela.stingpligtigbd die enigste of 
een van die hoofoogmerte van die transaksie, 
handeling of skema was,J 
(c) aangegaan. verrig of uitgevoer was uitsluitlik 
. of hoofsaaklik vir die doeleindes van die vermy-
ding of . die uitstel van aanspreeklikheid vir die 
beta.ling van • n belasting of hefting (hetsy opgele 
deur hierclie Wet of 'n vorige lnkomstebelastingwet 
of 'n ander wet deur die Sek:rctaris uitgevoer) of die 
vermindering ·van die bedrag van bedoelde 
belastingpligtigheid, 
stel die Sekretaris die belastingpligtigheid ten opsigte 
van enige belasting of heffing deur hierdie Wet opgele, 
Eop inkomsteJ asook die bedrag daarvan, vas asof die 
transaksie, handeling of skema nie aangegaan, verrig of 
uitgevoer is nie, of op so :n ·wyse vas as wat by in die 
omstandighede van die geval gepas ag vir die voorko-
ming of beperking van sodanigc ~yding, uitstel of 
vermindering. · · · · , · · 
(2) Wanneer die Sekretaris oortuig is dat 'n ooreen-
koms rakende 'n maatskappy of 'n verandering in die 
aandelebesit in 'n maatskappy; as 'n direkte of indirekte 
gevolg waarvan inkomste gedunmde· 'n jaar van aanslag 
ontvang is deur of toegeval bet aan daardie maatskappy, 
te eniger tyd . voor of na die inwerltingtreding van die 
Inkomstebelastingwet, 1946, deur 'n persoon aangegaan 
of teweeggebring is uitsluitlik of hoofsaaldik met die 
oogmerk om 'n vasgestelde verlics of 'n balans van 
vasgestelde verlies wat die maatskappy gcly het, aan te 
wend ten einde aanspreeldikheid aan die kant van 
daardie maatskappy of 'n ander persoon vir die beta.ling 
van 'n belasting of hefting op inkomste te vermy of die 
bed.rag daarvan te verminder, word die in vergelyking 
bring van so 'n vasgestelde verlies of balans van 
vasgestelde verlies teen bedoelde inkomste van die hand 
gewys. "; en · • • , 
(b) deur subartikel (4) deur die volgende subartikel te 
vervang: 
,.(4) 'n Beslissing~ van die Sekretaris ingevolge 
subartikel (1), (2) of (3) 1s aan beswaar en appel 
onderhewig, en wanneer bv ' verrilZtings wat daarop 
betrekking het. oewys woro aat die onderhawige 
transa.lcsie, hanaeung, skema. ooreenJcoms of verande-
ring in aandelebes1t. die vennydlng of die uitstel van 
aanspreekJikheid •VU' betaling van enige belasting of 
hefting [op mkomsteJ wat opgele is deur hierdie 
Wet of 'n vonge lrucomstebelasringwet of 4n ander wet 
deur die Sekretaris uitgevoer, of die vermindering van 
die bedrag daarvan, ten gevolg sou be. word vennoed, 
totdat die teendeel bewys word;_ 
(a) in die geval van so 'n transatesie, handeling of 
skema, dat (die enigste oogmerk of een van die 
hoofoogmerke daananJ dit uitsluitlik of hoof-
saaklik aangegaan, vmig of uitgevoer is vir die 
doeleindes van die vermyding of die uitstel van of 
die vermindering van die bedrag van sodanige 
bclastingpligtigheid [wasJ; of 
(b) in. die geval van so 'n ooreenkoms of verandering 
.in aandelcbcsit, dat dit aangegaan of teweeggebring 
i£ uitsluidik of hoofsaalclik met die oogmerk om die 
onderhawige vasgestelde verlies of balans van 
vasgestelde verlies aan te wend ten einde bedoelde 
aansprecklikheid .te vermy of uit te stel of die 
bedrag daarvan te verminder. '' 
:Act No. 121, 1984 
37. Section 103 of the principal Act is hereby amended--:-
(aJ by the substitution for subsection (2) of the following 
subsection: 
"(2) Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that any 
agreement affecting any company or any change in the 
shareholding in any company or in the members' inter-
ests in any company which is a close corporation. as a 
direct or indirect result of which income has been re-
ceived by or has accrued to that company during any 
year of assessment, has at any time before or after the 
commencement of the Income Tax Act, 1946, been en-
tered into or· effected by any person solely or mainly 
for the purpose of utilizing any assessed loss or any bal-
ance of assessed loss incurred by the company, in order 
to avoid liability on the part of that company or any 
other person for the payment of any tax, duty or levy 
on income, or to reduce the amount thereof, the set-off 
of any such assessed loss or balance of assessed loss 
against any such income shall be disallowed."; 
·(b) by the substitution in subsection ( 4) for the words pre-
ceding paragraph (a) of the following words: 
"Any decision of the Commissioner under subsection 
(1), (2) or (3) shall be subject to objection and appeal, 
and whenever in proceedings relating thereto it is 
proved that the transaction, operation, scheme, agree-
ment or change in shareholding or members' interests 
in question would result in the avoidance or the post-
-, ponement of liability for payment of any tax, duty or 
. levy imposed by this Act or any previous Income Tax 
Act or any other law administered by the Commission-
er. or in the reduction of the amourit thereof, it shall be 
presumed, until the contrary is proved-"; and 
(c) by the substitution for paragraph (b) of subsection (4) 
, of the following paragraph:: 
"(b) in the · case of any such agreement or change in 
shareholdin11: or members' interests; that· it has 
been entered into or,effected solely or mainly for· 
the purpose of utilizing the assessed loss or balance 
of assessed· loss in question in:- order to avoid or 
postpone such liability or·to reduce the amount 
thereof.". 
Amendment of 
section 103 of 
Act 58 of 1962. 
as amended bv 
section 14 of · 
Act 101 of 1978. 
Wet No. 121, 1984 
Wvsiging van 
artikel l03 van 
Wet 58 van l962. 
soos gewysig deur 
artikel 14 van 
Wet !Olvan 1978. 
37. Artikel 103 van die Hoofwet word hierby gewysig-
(a) deur subartikel (2) deur die volgende subartikel te ver-
van11:: 
"(2) Wanneer die Kommissaris oortuig is dat 'n oor-
eenkoms rakende 'n maatskappy of 'n verandering in 
die aandelebesit in ·n maatskappy of in die ledebelange 
in 'n maatska ov wat 'n beslote ko oras1e 1s. as n di-
re te ot m ire te gevo g waarvan m omste gedurende 
'n jaar van aanslag ontvang is deur of toegeval het aan 
daardie maatskappy, te eniger tyd voor of na die inwer-
kingtreding van die Inkomstebelastingwet, 1946, deur 
'n persoon aangegaan of teweeggebring is uitsluitlik of 
hoofsaaklik met die oogmerk om 'n vasgestelde verlies 
of 'n balans van vasgestelde verlies wat~ die maatskap-
py gely het. aan te wend ten einde aanspreeklikheid 
aan die kant van daardie maatskappy of ·n ander per-
soon vir die betaling van 'n belasting of heffing op in-
komste te vermy of die bedrag daarvan te verminder, 
word die in vergelyking bring van so 'n vasgestelde ver-
Iies of balans van vasgestelde verlies teen bedoelde in-
komste van die hand gewys."; 
(b) deur in subartikel (4) die woorde wat paragraaf (a) 
voorafgaan deur die volgende woorde te vervang: 
" 'n Beslissing van die Kommissaris ingevolge subar-
tikel (1), (2) of (3) is aan beswaar en appel onderhe-
wig, en wanneer by verrigtings wat daarop betrekking 
het, bewys word dat die onderhawige transkasie, han-
deling, skema, ooreenkoms of verandering in aandele-
besit of ledebelange, die vermyding of die uitstel van 
aanspreeklikheid vir . betaling · van enige belasting of 
hefting wat opgele is deur hierdie Wet of 'n vorige In-
komstebelastingwet of 'n ander wet deur die Korrtmis-
. saris uitgevoer, of die vermindering van die bedrag 
daarvan, ten gevolg sou-he, word vermoed, totdat die 
teendeel bewys wor~"; en 
( c) deur paragraaf (b) van subartikel ( 4) deur die volgende 
paragraaf te vervang: 
"(b) .in die geval van so 'n ooreenkoms of verandering 
. in aandelebesit of ledebelange, .dat dit aangegaan 
of teweeggebring is u1tsluitlilc of hoofsaaklik met 
die oogmerk om die onderhawig~ vasgestelde ver-
lies of balans van vasgestelde verlies aan te wend 
ten einde bedoelde aanspreeklikheid te. vermy of 
uit te stel of die bedrag daarvan te verminder. ". 
Act No. 70, 1989 
Amendment of section 103 of Act 58 of 1962, as amended by section 14 of Act 101 of 
I 978 and section 37 of Act 121 of 1984 
19. Section 103 of the principal Act is hereby amended by the addition of the 
following subsection: _ _ 
- "(5) (a) Where under any transaction. operation or scheme any taxpayer has 
ceded his right to receive any amount of interest in exchange for any! 
amount of dividends, and in consequence of such cession the taxpayer's 
liability for normal tax, as detennined before applying the provisions of this 
subsection, has been reduced or extinguished, the Commissioner shall 
detennine the liability for nonnal tax of the taxpayer and any other party 
to the transaction, operation or scheme as if such cession had not been 
effected. --
(b) Paragraph (a) shall be deemed to have come into operation on 22 
December 1988 and shall apply-
(i) to any transaction, operation or scheme concluded on or after that 
date; and 
(ii) to any transaction, operation or scheme concluded before that date, if 
the taxpayer is at liberty to tenninate the operation of such transac-
tion. operation or scheme without incurring liability for damages, 
compensation or similar relief.". 
Wet No. 70. 1989 
Wysiging van artikel 103 van Wet 58 van 1962, soos gewysig deur artikel 14 van Wet 
101 van 1978 en artikel 37 van Wet 121 van 1984 
19. (1) Artikel 103 van die Hoofwet word hierby gewysig deur die volgende 
subartikel bv te voeg: 
"(5) fa) Waar-ingevolge 'n transaksie. handeling of skema 'n belastingpligtige 
sy reg om ·n bedrag aan rente te ontvang. gesedeer het in ruil vir ·n bedragl 
aan dividende, en as gevolg van bedoelde sessie die belastingpligtige se 
aanspreeklikheid vir normale belasting, soos vasgestel voor die toepassing 
van die bepalings van hierdie subartikel, verminder of uitgewis is. kan die 
Kommissaris die aanspreeklikheid vir normale belasting van die belasting-
pligtige en enige ander party tot die transaksie, handeling of skema vasstel 
asof bedoelde sessie nie uitgevoer is nie. 
(b) Paragraaf (a) word geag.op 22 J?esember 1988 in werking te getree het en 
is van toepassing-
(i) op enige transaksie, handeling of skema wat op of na daardie datum 
gesluit is; en · 
· -(ii) op enige transaksie, handeling of skema wat voor daardie datum 
gesluit is, indien dit die belastingpligtige vrystaan om die werking van 
bedoelde transaksie, handeling of skema te beeindig sonder om 
aanspreeklikheid vir skadevergoeding, skadeloosstelling of soortge-
lyke verligting aan te gaan.". 
s 73 VAT ACT 
Schemes for obtaining undue tax benefits 
73. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Act. whenever the Commissioner is 
satisfied that any scheme (whether entered into or carried out before or after the 
commencement of this Act, and including a scheme involving the alienation of 
property)-
(a) has been entered into or carried out which has the effect of granting a tax 
benefit to any person; and 
(b) having regard to the substance of the scheme-
(i) was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would 
not normally be employed for bona fide business purposes, other than 
the obtaining of a tax benefit; or 
(ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created 
between persons dealing at arm's length; and 
(c) was entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purpose of obtaining 
a tax benefit. · 
the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax imposed by this Act. 
and the amount thereof. as if the scheme had not been entered into or carried 
out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he deems appropriate 
for the prevention or diminution of such tax benefit. 
(2) For the purposes of this section-
'scheme' includes any transaction, operation. scheme or understanding 
(whether enforceable or not) including all steps and transactions by which 
it is carried into effect; 
'tax benefit' includes-
(a) any reduction in the liability of any person to pay tax; or 
(b) any increase in the entitlement of any vendor to a refund of tax; or 
(c) any reduction in the consideration payable by any person in respect of 
any supply of goods or services; or 
(d) any other avoidance or postponement of liability for the payment of 
any tax. duty or levy imposed by this Act or by any other law 
administered by the Commissioner. 
(3) Any decision of the Commissioner under this section shall be subject to 
objection and appeal, and whenever in proceedings relating thereto it is proved 
that the scheme concerned does or would result in a tax benefit. it shall be 
presumed. until the contrary is proved that such scheme was entered into or 
carried out solely or mainly for the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit. 
Appendix II Foreign anti-avoidance provisions 
s 260 in Australia 
s 108 in New Zealand 
s 99 in New Zealand 
AUSTRALIA 
s 260 PART VIII - MISCELLANEOUS 
SECTION 260 - CONTRACTS TO EVADE TAX VOID 
TEXT OF SECTION 260 · 
260 (1) [Defeating, evading, avoiding etc taxes] Every contract, agreement, or 
arrangement made or entered into, orally or in writing, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act, shall so far as it has or purports to have the purpose or effect of 
in any way, directly or indirectly -
(a) altering the incidence of any income tax; 
(b) relieving any person from liability to pay any income tax or make any return; 
(c) defeating, evading, or avoiding any duty or liability imposed on any person by this 
~m ..
( d) preventing the operation of this Act in any respect, 
be absolutely void, as against the Commissioner, or in regard to any proceeding under this 
Act, but without prejudice to such validity as it may have in any other respect or for any other 
purpose. 
260 (2) [Scope of application] This section does not apply to any contract, agreement or 
arrangement made or entered into after 27 May 1981. 
[sub-s (2) insrt Act 110 of 1981 s 10) 
NEW ZEALAND 
·rois. :\gree:nents purpon:mg to alter mc1aence ot taxation to be vo1c1-
Every contract, agreement, or arrangement made or entered into, whether 
before or after the commencement of this Aet, shall be absoiutely void in so far 
as, directly or indirectly, it has or purports to have the purpose or effect of in 
any way altering the incidence of income tax, or reiieving any person from his 
liability to pay income tax.' 
Section 99 is headed 'Agreements purporting to alter incidence of tax to be void' 
and, so far as material, provided in the relevant income tax year ended 31 March 
1978 as follows: 
'(1) For the purposes of this section-
"Arrangement" means any contract, agreement, plan, or understanding 
(whether enforceable or unenforceable) including all steps and transactions 
by which it is carried into effect: 
"Liability" includes a potential or prospective liability in respect of future 
income: 
"Tax avoidance" includes-
(a) Directly or indirectly altering the incidence of any income tax: 
(b) Directly or indirectly relieving any person from liability to pay income 
tax: 
(c) Directly or indirectly avoiding, reducing, or postponing any liability 
to income tax. 
(2) Every arrangement made or entered into, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act, shall be absolutely void as against the Commissioner 
for income tax purposes if and to the extent that;directly or indirectly,-
(a) Its purpose or effect is tax avoidance; or 
(b) Where it has two or more purposes or effects, one of its purposes or 
effects (not being a merely incidental purpose or effect) is tax avoidance, 
whether or not any other or others of its purposes or effects relate to, or 
are referable to, ordinary business or family dealings,-
whether or not any person affected by that arrangement is a party thereto. 
(3) Where an arrangement is void in accordance with subsection (2) of this 
section, the assessable income and the non-assessable income of any person 
affected by that arrangement shall be adjusted in such manner as the 
Commissioner considers appropriate so as to counteract any tax advanatge 
obtained by that person from or under that arrangement .. .' 
